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CRIMINAL LAW
BRECHT v. ABRAHAMSON: HARMFUL
ERROR IN HABEAS CORPUS LAW*
James S. Liebman** and Randy Hertz***
I.

INTRODUCTION: THE COURT'S NEW HARMLESS ERROR STANDARD
FOR HABEAS CORPUS CASES

For the past two and one-half decades, the Supreme Court and
the lower federal courts have applied the same rule for assessing the
harmlessness of constitutional error in habeas corpus proceedings
as they have applied on direct appeal of both state and federal convictions. 1 Under that rule, which applied to all constitutional errors
except those deemed per se prejudicial or per se reversible, 2 the state
could avoid reversal upon a finding of error only by proving that the
error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.3 The Supreme
* The authors gratefully acknowledge the help of John H. Blume, Director of the
South Carolina Death Penalty Resource Center, in thinking through the issues and
developing many of the ideas discussed in this Article. A version of this Article appears
in JAMES S. LIEBMAN & RANDY HERTZ, FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE, ch. 27A (1993 Cum. Supp.).
** Professor of Law, Columbia University School of Law.
*** Professor of Law, New York University School of Law.
1 See generally WAYNE R. LAFAVE & JEROLD H. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 26.6

(1992);

JACK

B.

WEINSTEIN

&

MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE MANUAL

§ 2.03(05) (1992); RODGERJ. TRAYNOR, THE RIDDLE OF HARMLESS ERROR (1970); Martha
A. Field, Assessing the Harmlessnessof FederalConstitutionalError-A Process in Need of a Rationale, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 15 (1976); Steven H. Goldberg, Harmless Error: Constitutional
Sneak Thief, 71 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 421 (1980); Henry P. Monaghan, Harmless
Error and the Valid Rule Requirement, 1989 Sup. CT. REV. 195; Steven A. Saltzburg, The
Harm of Harmless Error, 59 VA. L. REV. 988 (1973); Tom Stacy & Kim Dayton, Rethinking
Harmless Constitutional Error, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 79 (1988); Note, Harmless Error,
ProsecutorialMisconduct, and Due Process: There's More to Due Process than the Bottom Line, 88
COLUM. L. REV. 1298 (1988) [hereinafter Harmless Error, ProsecutorialMisconduct]; Note,
Harmful Use of Harmless Error in Criminal Cases, 64 CORNELL L. REV. 538 (1979); Note,
Deadly Mistakes: Harmless Errorin CapitalSentencing, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 740 (1987).
2 See infra notes 72-111 and accompanying text.
3 See, e.g., Yates v. Evatt, 111 S. Ct. 1884, 1892 (1991); Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570,
582 (1986).
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Court adopted this stringent standard in Chapman v. California4 to
fulfill the federal courts' responsibility to "protect people from infractions by the States of federally guaranteed rights." 5 Although
Chapman itself arose on direct appeal, the Court understood the decision's harmless error rule to be of constitutional magnitude 6 and,
consistent with the principle of parity between direct and habeas
7
corpus consideration of constitutional issues in the federal courts,
the Court repeatedly and routinely applied the same standard in
habeas corpus proceedings." So did the lower federal courts. 9
4 386 U.S. 18 (1967).
5 Id. at 21. The Chapman Court believed that its standard was necessary to protect

rights that are "rooted in the Bill of Rights, offered and championed in the Congress by
James Madison, who told the Congress that the 'independent' federal courts would be
the 'guardians of those rights.' " Id.
6 See, e.g., Brecht v. Abrahamson, 113 S.Ct. 1710, 1725-26 (1993) (White, J., dissenting) (discussing Chapman, 386 U.S. at 21). The Brecht majority never addressed Justice White's point in dissent that the Chapman rule is constitutionally mandated. Had the
Court acknowledged the rule's constitutional status, it could not have concluded that
"[tihe federal habeas corpus statute is silent on ...the standard for harmless-error
review ....
" Brecht, 113 S. Ct. at 1718. Thus, assuming, as Chapman does and as Brecht
does not dispute, that the Constitution dictates relief from constitutional errors not
shown to be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, the habeas corpus statute's provision
for relief upon a showing that the petitioner is "incustody in violation of the Constitution ... of the United States" provides for relief from all constitutional violations save
those satisfying Chapman's strict harmlessness standard. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a).
7 See James S. Liebman, Apocalypse Next Time: The Anachronistic Attack on Habeas
Corpus/DirectReview Parity, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1997, 1999-2010 (1992).
8 See, e.g., Yates v. Evatt, 111 S.Ct. 1884, 1892 (1991); Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570,

582 (1986); Hopper v. Evans, 456 U.S. 605, 613-14 (1982); Milton v. Wainwright, 407
U.S. 371, 372-73 (1972); Anderson v. Nelson, 390 U.S. 523, 525 (1968) (percuriam). In a
decision later in the same term as Brecht, its author, Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined a
separate opinion acknowledging (i) that "there [was] ... reason to consider ourselves
bound by precedent . . . in Brecht" to apply the Chapman standard in habeas corpus

proceedings and (ii) that "our consistent practice of applying... Chapman ...to cases
on collateral review [arguably] precluded us from limiting the rule's application to cases
on direct review." Harper v. Virginia Dep't of Taxation, 113 S.Ct. 2510, 2529 (1993)
(O'Connor, J., dissenting). The Court's statement in Brecht that none of its prior habeas
corpus decisions applying the Chapman rule "squarely addressed the issue" of what standard of harmlessness applied in habeas corpus proceedings, and that those decisions "at
most assumed the applicability of the Chapman standards," may be misleading. Brecht,
113 S.Ct. at 1718. A number of the Court's prior decisions focused exclusively on the
question whether, having found constitutional violations, federal habeas corpus courts
nonetheless could withhold relief because the violations were harmless. See, e.g., Milton,
407 U.S. 371; Anderson, 390 U.S. 523. And at least one of those decisions addressed the
precise question of the standard of prejudice or harmlessness, if any, that should apply
in determining whether a particular constitutional violation required habeas corpus relief. Rose, 478 U.S. 570.
9 See, e.g., Lesko v. Lehman, 925 F.2d 1527, 1546 (3d Cir. 1991); Dickson v. Sullivan,
849 F.2d 403, 405 (9th Cir. 1988); Wilson v. Murray, 806 F.2d 1232, 1238 (4th Cir.
1986); Phelps v. Duckworth, 772 F.2d 1410, 1413-15 (7th Cir. 1985) (en banc); Crutchfield v. Wainwright, 772 F.2d 839, 843 (11 th Cir. 1985); Hawkins v. LeFevre, 758 F.2d
866, 877-78 (2d Cir. 1985); Blackwell v. Brewer, 562 F.2d 596, 600 (8th Cir. 1977).
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In its 1993 decision in Brecht v. Abrahamson,10 however, a bare
majority of the Court ruled that a new and different measure of
harmless error should apply in federal habeas corpus proceedings.
The applicable standard is the one the Court fashioned in 1946 in
Kotteakos v. United States I for assessing the harmlessness of nonconstitutional errors:1 2 an error may be deemed harmless if the reviewing court finds that "the error did not influence the jury, or had but
very slight effect"' 13 and that "the judgment was not substantially
swayed by the error."'1 4 Or, to use the phrase the Brecht Court most
frequently extracted from Kotteakos, "the standard for determining
whether habeas relief must be granted is whether the.., error 'had
substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the
jury's verdict.' "15
Tojustify the newly drawn distinction between the harmless error rule that applies on direct appeal and the different one that applies in habeas corpus, the Brecht majority pointed to "the State's
interest in the finality of convictions that have survived direct review
within the state court system" and concerns of "comity and federalism."'1 6 It is difficult to see how these rationales justify Brecht's al10 113 S. Ct. at 1710.
11 328 U.S. 750 (1946).
12 Brecht, 113 S. Ct. at 1722 ("We hold that the Kotteahos harmless-error standard
applies in determining whether habeas relief must be granted because of constitutional
error of the trial type."). Cf infra notes 72-111 and accompanying text ("per se prejudice" standard applicable to "structural" errors); infra notes 177-90 and accompanying
text (possible exception for "trial errors" of a certain sort).
13 Kotteakos, 328 U.S. at 764.
14 Id. at 765.
15 Brecht, 113 S. Ct. at 1714 (quoting Kotteakos, 328 U.S. at 776); accord Brecht, 113 S.
Ct. at 1718, 1718 n.7, 1722; id. at 1724 (Stevens, J., concurring). Although there are
good reasons for doing otherwise, see Liebman & Hertz, supra note *, § 22A.8 (1993
Cum. Supp.), the federal courts probably will apply the Brecht rule retroactively-as did
the Court itself in Brecht-to all cases reaching them on habeas corpus, no matter how
far along in their proceedings those cases were when the Court announced Brecht. See
Henry v. Estelle, 993 F.2d 1423, 1427 n.2 (9th Cir. 1993) (Brecht applies retroactively).
See also decisions cited infra note 145 (applying Brecht retroactively, albeit without acknowledging any argument for doing otherwise). Cf Harper v. Virginia Dep't of Taxation, 113 S. Ct. 2510, 2518 (1993) (civil case in which Court approvingly notes courts'
traditional practice of applying all new rulings retroactively in all cases, and in which
Court holds that, when Court applies new rule to litigant in civil case in which new rule
was announced, rule also applies to all other civil litigants); Lockhart v. Fretwell, 113 S.
Ct. 838, 844 (1993) (dicta) (new rules of criminal procedure beneficial to the states apply
retroactively on habeas corpus, even though new rules of criminal procedure beneficial
to petitioners generally do not apply retroactively on habeas corpus).
16 Brecht, 113 S. Ct. at 1720. Because the Brecht majority apparently premised these
justifications on an assumption that a finding of harmlessness by the state courts under
the more stringent Chapman rule always will precede habeas corpus review of the harmlessness question under the less stringent Brecht rule, the Eighth Circuit has limited
Brecht to situations in which the state courts in fact have previously applied the Chapman
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most singular departure from over 200 years of direct
appeal/habeas corpus parity in the scope and standard of review of
constitutional issues. 1 7 As Justice O'Connor observed in her dissent
in Brecht, the interests identified by the majority have little bearing
on the choice of harmless error standard.1 8 Rather, as Justice White
rule. See Omdorff v. Lockhart, 998 F.2d 1426, 1430 (8th Cir. 1993). In the Eighth
Circuit, therefore, if the state courts did not apply Chapman, the federal courts on habeas
corpus must themselves do so. See id. But cf. infra note 172 and accompanying text (federal courts should apply harmless error rule de novo, giving no deference to state court
determinations).
17 See Brecht, 113 S. Ct. at 1728 (White, J., dissenting). As Justice White explained:
[The Court's] habeas jurisprudence is taking on the appearance of a confused
patchwork in which different constitutional rights are treated according to their status, and in which the same constitutional right is treated differently depending on
whether its vindication is sought on direct or collateral review. I believe this picture
bears scant resemblance either to Congress' design or to our own precedents.
Id. See id. at 1731 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("Like Justice White, I do not believe we
should turn our habeas jurisprudence into a 'patchwork' of rules and exceptions without
strong justification.... The interest of efficiency, always relevant to the scope of habeas
relief . . . favors simplification of legal inquiries, not their multiplication.") (citation
omitted). On Congress and the Court's 200-year-old practice of treating the scope and
standard of review of constitutional questions identically on direct and habeas corpus
review, see Liebman, supra note 7, at 2055-94.
There is one way in which Brecht may be understood to preserve, rather than to
defeat, the principle of parity between the scope of constitutional review available on
direct appeal and the scope of review available in habeas corpus proceedings. The more
forgiving harmless error rule that now applies on habeas corpus may provide a rough
method of avoiding a windfall that successful habeas corpus petitioners otherwise might
receive in comparison to defendants who prevail on direct appeal. Because the time
lapse between trial and retrial is likely to be several years longer in the case of a successful habeas corpus petitioner than in the case of a successful direct appellant, the likelihood is greater in the habeas corpus context that a more favorable outcome on retrial
will be reached because of the staleness of the evidence of guilt, rather than the removal
of the violation that prompted the retrial. As the Court noted in Brecht:
Retrying defendants whose convictions are set aside also imposes significant "social
costs," including ...the "erosion of memory" and "dispersion of witnesses" which
accompany the passage of time and make obtaining convictions on retrial more difficult ....And since there is no statute of limitations governing federal habeas ...,
retrials following grants of habeas relief ordinarily take place much later than do
retrials following reversal on direct review.
Brecht, 113 S.Ct. at 1721 (citations omitted). See also Herrera v. Collins, 113 S. Ct. 853,
862 (1993) ("the passage of time [between the crime and a new trial ordered on habeas
corpus] only diminishes the reliability of criminal adjudications"); McCleskey v. Zant,
499 U.S. 467, 491 (1991) ("[Wlhen a habeas petitioner succeeds in obtaining a new trial,
the 'erosion of memory and dispersion of witnesses that occur with the passage of time'
prejudice the government and diminish the chances of a reliable criminal adjudication"
(quoting Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 453 (1986) (plurality opinion)). See also
Parke v. Raley, 113 S.Ct. 517, 525 (1992) ("To the extent the government fails to carry
its burden due to the staleness or unavailability of evidence.. ., its legitimate interest in
...punishing.., offenders is compromised.") The Brecht rule arguably neutralizes this
disparity in favor of habeas corpus petitioners by increasing the degree of certainty that
the error actually affected the original trial and, thus, that any improved outcome on
retrial flows from the removal of the error and not the staleness of the evidence.
18 Brecht, 113 S.Ct. at 1729 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor added:
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and Justice O'Connor emphasized in dissent in Brecht, and as one
member of the five-person majority seemed to acknowledge, the
most significant, statutorily recognized interest bearing on the
issue-the federal courts' obligation to vindicate federal constitutional rights and to protect criminal defendants from unconstitutional convictions and sentences-calls for restraint in finding
constitutional errors to be harmless, whether the federal forum is
direct review in the Supreme Court or habeas corpus review in the
federal courts as a whole.19
On analysis, indeed, the Brecht limitation on the applicability of
the Chapman rule may be as much an opening sally against the Chapman rule itself as it is an assault on the principle of direct appeal/habeas corpus parity. The Court thus may be setting the
groundwork for a switch to the Kotteakos harmless error standard
whenever a federal court finds constitutional trial error in any fo20
rum, whether on direct appeal or in postconviction proceedings.
I am not convinced that the principles governing the exercise of our federal habeas
powers-federalism, finality, and fairness-counsel against applying Chapman's
harmless-error standard on collateral review ....
IT]he Court does not explain how th[e] costs [of federal habeas corpus review]
set the harmless-error inquiry apart from any other question presented on habeas;
such costs are inevitable whenever relief is awarded. Unless we are to accept the
proposition that denying relief whenever possible is an unalloyed good, the costs
the Court identifies cannot by themselves justify the lowering of standards announced today.
Id. at 1732 (emphasis in original).
19 See id. at 1727 (White, J., dissenting) (majority's rejection of Chapman standard is
"at odds with the role Congress has ascribed to habeas review which is, at least in part,
to deter both prosecutors and courts from disregarding their constitutional responsibilities"). Justice White's opinion was joined on this point by Justices Blackmun and Souter. See also id. at 1729-30 (O'Connor, J., dissenting):
If there is a unifying theme to this Court's habeas jurisprudence, it is that the ultimate equity on the prisoner's side-the possibility that an error may have caused
the conviction of an actually innocent person-is sufficient by itself to permit plenary review of the prisoner's federal claim. . . . In my view, the harmless-error
standard often will be inextricably intertwined with the interest of reliability.
Justice Stevens, who supplied the fifth vote for the majority opinion in Brecht, did so only
because he viewed the Kotteakos standard as "appropriately demanding." Id. at 1723
(Stevens,J., concurring). Justice Stevens' concurrence emphasizes the many protections
embedded in the Kotteakos rule and observes that "the difference [between the Kotteakos
and Chapman standards] is less significant than it might seem." Id. at 1725 (Stevens, J.,
concurring).
20 In places, the majority opinion in Brecht suggests that its application of the Kotteakos standard stems not from the peculiarities of habeas corpus adjudication but instead from the dictates of the federal harmless error statute that succeeded the statute
interpreted in Kotteakos. See id. at 1718 ("the Kotteakos standard ... is grounded in the
federal harmless error statute. 28 U.S.C. § 2111 ....") (citation omitted); id. at 1718
n.7; id. at 1722 ("because the Kotteakos standard is grounded in the federal harmlesserror rule (28 U.S.C. § 2111), federal courts may turn to an existing body of case law in
applying it"); id. at 1723 (Stevens,J., concurring). The statute to which the Brecht majority refers reads as follows: "On the hearing of any appeal or writ of certiorari in any case,
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Prior to Brecht, the application of the harmless error rule in
habeas corpus cases did not merit special comment. The rule applied in the same, well-established manner in those cases as on direct appeal in virtually all American courts with jurisdiction over
criminal and constitutional matters. Any discussion of the intricacies of the harmless error rule consequently applied equally to direct appeal and habeas corpus. 2 1 Suddenly, however, Brecht has
thrown up for grabs the application of this previously well-understood set of doctrines, at least in habeas corpus cases. Courts now
must answer anew a whole series of potentially difficult questions.
For example, which party bears the burden of proving harmlessness
vel non in habeas corpus proceedings? To what constitutional issues
does harmless error analysis apply in habeas corpus cases? What
standards, criteria, and factors should govern the application of the
Brecht/Kotteakos rule? Are there exceptional circumstances in which
the Chapman standard should continue to apply in habeas corpus
cases?
Drawing on the Court's analysis in Brecht and the cases and
other sources that the Court there treats as authoritative, this Article
provides some preliminary answers to these and other questions
posed by the Court's adoption of the Brecht/Kotteakos rule in habeas
corpus cases. Part II discusses the question of which party bears the
burdens of pleading and proving an error's harmlessness. Part III
the court shall give judgment after an examination of the record without regard to errors or defects which do not affect the substantial rights of the parties." 28 U.S.C.
§ 2111 (emphasis added). As the Brecht Court at one point remarks (albeit acknowledging the remark's status as dicta), this statute "[o]n its face" makes no distinction between
review on direct appeal and in habeas corpus proceedings; between review in one type
of federal court and another; between federal review of state and federal court judgments; between constitutional and nonconstitutional claims; or even between criminal
and civil cases. Brecht, 113 S.Ct. at 1718. Although this same statute was in effect at the
time the Court decided Chapman, the Court there found that the statute, and the Kotteakos standard developed under it, did not govern constitutional error. See Chapman v.
California, 386 U.S. 18, 22-24 (1967). Now that the Court seems to have made Section
2111 authoritative, and now that the Court has rejected Chapman 's reading of the statute
to exempt constitutional error, see Brecht, 113 S.Ct. at 1718 n.7 (discussing section
2111's "amenab[ility] to harmless error review of constitutional error"), the statute
would appear to dictate application of the Kotteakos standard in all federal proceedings in
which relief from constitutional error is considered.
The Court's reliance on Section 2111 has one other important implication.
Although, as a rule of constitutional law, the Chapman standard applies equally in state
and federal court, see supra notes 4-6 and accompanying text, the Brecht/Kotteakos rule is
a creature of a federal statute that explicitly limits its mandate to federal court proceedings. As such, state courts are not bound by Brecht to apply the Kotteakos standard in
their own postconviction proceedings, nor would they be bound to do so in direct proceedings if the Kotteakos standard were to be extended to all federal court proceedings.
21 See, e.g., authorities cited supra note 1.
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addresses the concept of "prejudice per se" and the categories of errors that the Court exempts from harmless-error analysis. Part IV
provides a detailed examination of the new test of harmless error,
the degree of certainty required before a court can find that test
satisfied, the focus of the court's attention and the criteria it appropriately may consider in determining harmlessness, and the manner
in which a court should go about informing its judgment on the
harmless error question. Finally, Part V discusses an exception to
the Brecht/Kotteakos rule that Brecht appears to recognize for trial errors involving egregious or cumulative misconduct.
II.
A.

ALLOCATION OF THE BURDENS OF PLEADING AND PROOF

ALLOCATION OF THE BURDEN OF PLEADING

Like other defenses to habeas corpus relief, the "harmless error" obstacle does not arise unless the state asserts it; the state's
failure to do so in a timely and unequivocal fashion waives the defense. 2 2 Indeed, the "harmless error" rule is particularly susceptible to the types of abuse that have led the Supreme Court to call for
strict application of waiver rules to the state in habeas corpus proceedings. Absent allocation to the state of the burden of pleading,
the state initially could limit its arguments to the question of
whether error occurred, thus "seek[ing] a favorable ruling on the
merits .. .while holding the [harmless error] defense in reserve for

use" 23 only after the district court has ruled against the state on the
24
merits or, worse, after the merits ruling has gone up on appeal.
B.

ALLOCATION OF THE BURDEN OF PROOF

Before the Court's decision in Brecht, the applicable rule of
22 See, e.g., Holland v. McGinnis, 963 F.2d 1044, 1057-58 (7th Cir. 1992) (state
waived harmless error argument by withholding it until oral argument before court of
appeals); Wilson v. O'Leary, 895 F.2d 378, 384 (7th Cir. 1990) (Easterbrook, J.) (state
waived harmless error argument by withholding it until reply brief; "[p]rocedural rules
apply to the government as well as to defendants"). See also Amadeo v. Zant, 486 U.S.
214, 228 n.6 (1988) (finding forfeiture by state of analogous question of "prejudice" for
purposes of the "cause and prejudice" exception to the procedural default defense). Cf.
Lufkins v. Leapley, 965 F.2d 1477, 1481 (8th Cir. 1992) ("While the government may
waive harmless error [by failing to raise it in timely fashion], an appellate court has
discretion to overlook the waiver under certain circumstances."). See generally LIEBMAN &
HERTZ, supra note *, §§ 22A.3, 23.3a, 23A.2, 24.2a, 25.3a, 26.3a (1993 Cum. Supp.)
(waivability of other habeas corpus defenses).
23 Granberry v. Greer, 481 U.S. 129, 132 (1987).
24 See, e.g., Wilson, 895 F.2d at 384 ("Astoundingly, the state did not mention harmless error in its opening brief. It tried instead to persuade us that there was nothing
wrong with any of the statements. It got 'round to harmless error at page 19 of its reply
brief.").
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Chapman v. California2 5 squarely placed the burden of proving harmlessness beyond a reasonable doubt on the state. 26 This allocation
of the burden applied in habeas corpus proceedings as well as on
27
direct appeal.
Although Brecht changes the substantive standard for assessing
the harmlessness of constitutional error in habeas corpus proceedings, it apparently leaves intact the preexisting allocation to the state
of the burden of proving harmlessness. Regrettably, however, especially for litigants and judges faced with the Court's substitution of
the confusion-ridden Kotteakos standard 28 for the thoroughly understood Chapman rule, the majority did not explicitly reach this conclusion but instead left it to be inferred from other aspects of its
opinion and the sources on which it relied. 29 The Court's dereliction, by remaining silent on the allocation of the burden of proof, is
all the more vexing given the debate that rages on the issue in separate opinions in the case. Thus, although Justice Stevens, who provided the necessary fifth vote for the majority, wrote a concurring
opinion designed explicitly to make clear, among other things, that
the Brecht/Kotteakos standard "places the burden on prosecutors to
explain why . . . errors [are] harmless," 30 Justice White's dissent
25 386 U.S. 18 (1967).
26 See id. at 24 ("beneficiary of a constitutional error" must "prove beyond a reason-

able doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained"). See
also Brecht v. Abrahamson, 113 S. Ct. 1710, 1717 (1993) (under Chapman, "[tlhe State
bears the burden of proving that an error passes muster"); id. at 1727 (White,J., dissenting) ("Under Chapman, the state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the constitutional error 'did not contribute to the verdict obtained.'" (quoting Chapman, 386 U.S.
at 24)).
27 See, e.g., Dickson v. Sullivan, 849 F.2d 403, 405 (9th Cir. 1988); Wilson v. Murray,
806 F.2d 1232, 1238 (4th Cir. 1986); Crutchfield v. Wainwright, 772 F.2d 839, 843 (11 th
Cir. 1985); Hawkins v. LeFevre, 758 F.2d 866, 877 n.15 (2d Cir. 1985); Phelps v. Duckworth, 757 F.2d 811, 820 (7th Cir.), rev'd on other grounds, 772 F.2d 1410 (7th Cir. 1985)
(en banc); Blackwell v. Brewer, 562 F.2d 596, 600 (8th Cir. 1977).
28 More accurately, the confusion stems from the current status of the Kotteakos rule
following amendment of the statute the decision interpreted. Kotteakos itself is rather
clear on most of the issues on which the lower courts have split since the 1949 amendment of the statute under which the Court decided Kotteakos in 1946. See infra notes 5768 and accompanying text.
29 The majority's silence on the allocation of the burden of proof also is vexing because of the importance of the question. As the Court frequently has noted, assessing
harmlessness is inherently difficult, thus often making the outcome of the proceeding
dependent on the question of which party bears the burden of proof. See, e.g., Sullivan v.
Louisiana, 113 S. Ct. 2078, 2081-83 (1993); Doggett v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 2686,
2692-93 (1992). The Court has granted certiorari in O'Neal v. McAninch, 114 S. Ct.
1396 (1994), to resolve the question of which party bears the burden of proof under
Brecht.
30 Brecht, 113 S. Ct. at 1723 (Stevens,J., concurring). See also id. at 1723-24 (Stevens,
J., concurring) ("Kotteakos plainly stated that unless an error is merely 'technical,' the
burden of sustaining a verdict by demonstrating that the error was harmless rests on the
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characterizes the majority opinion as "impos[ing] on the defendant
the burden of establishing that the error 'resulted in "actual
prejudice."' ... 31
The best place to begin the analysis that the majority necessitated by its silence on this important question is by noting what the
Court did not hold. Justice White's dissent notwithstanding, there
are at least five good reasons why the majority opinion cannot be
read to assign the burden of proof to the petitioner.
First, the majority opinion contains not a single passage or
word devoted expressly to the allocation of the burden of proof.
Second, other parts of the majority opinion stand for the proposition that issues not "squarely addressed" by the Court should not
be taken as decided. 3 2 Third, the majority opinion clearly acknowledged the difference between the "Chapman ... standardfor determining whether a conviction must be set aside because of federal
constitutional error[, i.e.,] ... whether the error 'was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt' "3 and Chapman's allocation of the "burden of proving that an error passes muster under this standard,"
which, as the Court noted, "[t]he State bears." 3 4 Yet, when the
Court came to state how its holding changed Chapman, it repeatedly
referred only to the Chapman "standard." 3 5 Fourth, Justice Stevens
prosecution. A constitutional violation, of course, would never fall in the 'technical'
category.").
31 Id. at 1727 (White,J., dissenting). The passage from the majority opinion to which
Justice White refers when he interprets the majority decision as assigning the burden to
the defendant is discussed infra note 43 and accompanying text.
32 Brecht, 113 S. Ct. at 1718 (discussed supra note 8); see Harper v. Virginia Dep't of
Taxation, 113 S. Ct. 2510, 2529 (1993) (O'Connor,J. dissenting) (treating Brecht as leading decision for proposition that even consistent practice of Court cannot be assumed to
decide question absent Court's direct and explicit consideration of the issue).
33 Brecht, 113 S. Ct. at 1713 (emphasis added).
34 Id. at 1717 (emphasis added); see id. at 1721.
35 Initially, the Court described the change it was adopting as follows:
[Tihe standardfor determining whether habeas relief must be granted is whether the
•.. error "had substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's
verdict." Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 776 (1946). The Kotteakos harmless error standard is better tailored to the nature and purpose of collateral review
than the Chapmanstandard, and application of a less onerous harmless-error standard
on habeas promotes the considerations underlying our habeas jurisprudence.
Id. at 1714 (emphasis added). The Court's subsequent statements were to like effect.
For example, the Court stated:
Respondent urges us to fill this gap [in the statute in regard to harmless error] with
the Kotteakos standard,under which an error requires reversal only if it "had substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict." Kotteakos,
328 U.S., at 776. This standardis grounded in the federal harmless error statute. 28
U.S.C. § 2111 ....
Id. at 1718 (emphasis added). Later the Court stated:
The imbalance of the costs and benefits of applying the Chapman harmless-error
standardon collateral review counsels in favor of applying a less onerous standard on
habeas review of constitutional error. The Kotteakos standard, we believe, fills the
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wrote explicitly to say that he would not have joined the majority
opinion, thus providing the fifth and decisive vote, but for his understanding that the opinion placed the burden of proof on the
state. 36 Fifth, five Justices-Justice Stevens in a concurring opinion
and Justices White, Blackmun, O'Connor, and Souter in dissenting
opinions-explicitly endorsed harmless error rules that allocate the
burden of proving harmlessness to the state.3 7 In sum, there is simply no basis for discerning in Brecht a holding allocating the burden
to the habeas corpus petitioner. If there is a "majority" view on the
question, it is that the state should bear the burden.
Nor is there anything fanciful about Justice Stevens' discernment of an implicit allocation of the burden to the state in a majority
opinion that, to be sure, says nothing explicitly on the question.
The clear and quite explicit rule of Brecht, repeated over and over
again in both the majority opinion and Justice Stevens' concurrence,
is that, to whatever extent the decision changes preexisting law on
harmless error, it does so by adopting the rule of Kotteakos.3 8 Morebill. The test under Kotteakos is whether the error "had substantial and injurious
effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict." 328 U.S. at 776.
Id. at 1721-22 (emphasis added). See also id. at 1722 ("For the foregoing reasons, then,
we hold that the Kotteakos harmless-error standardapplies in determining whether habeas
relief must be granted because of constitutional error of the trial type." (emphasis

added)).
36 See Brecht, 113 S. Ct. at 1723 (Stevens, J., concurring):
[In deciding] what the collateral attack standard should be for a[ ] [trial] error, .
[t]he Court . .. endorsfes] Justice Rutledge's thoughtful opinion for the Court in
Kotteakos ....
Because that standard ... places the burden on prosecutors to explain why those errors were harmless ....
I am convinced that our [holding] is

correct. I write separately only to emphasize that the standard is appropriately
demanding.
See also supra note 30 and accompanying text.
37 See Brecht, 113 S. Ct. at 1723-24 (Stevens, J., concurring); id. at 1727 (White, J.,
dissenting); id. at 1729 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
38 See, e.g., id. at 1713-14:
In this case we must decide whether the Chapman harmless-error standard applies in
determining whether ... [a constitutional violation] entitles petitioner to habeas
relief. We hold that it does not. Instead, the standard for determining whether
habeas relief must be granted is whether the ... error "had substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict." Kotteakos v. United States,
328 U.S. 750, 776 ... (1946). The Kotteakos harmless-error standard is better tailored to the nature and purpose of collateral review than the Chapman standard, and
application of a less onerous harmless-error standard on habeas promotes the considerations underlying our habeas jurisprudence.
See also id. at 1721-22 ("The imbalance of the costs and benefits of applying the Chapman
harmless-error standard on collateral review counsels in favor of applying a less onerous
standard on habeas review of constitutional error. The Kotteakos standard, we believe,
fills the bill."); id. at 1722 ("[Wle hold that the Kotteakos harmless-error standard applies
in determining whether habeas relief must be granted because of constitutional error of
the trial type."); id. at 1724 (Stevens, J., concurring) ("The Kotteakos standard . . . will
now apply on collateral review .... "); id. (discussing how, in the future, the courts
should "apply the Kotteakos standard properly").
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over, as Justice Stevens wrote separately to point out, the clear and
explicit ruling of Kotteakos is that the government bears the burden
of proving the harmlessness of nontechnical (including all constitutional) error. Before the Kotteakos decision, the lower courts evidenced considerable confusion as to whether the then-existing
harmless error statute governing nonconstitutional error, 28 U.S.C.
§ 391,39 called for allocation of the burden to the appellant or the
appellee. 40 Kotteakos resolved the issue by definitively declaring that
the appellant bears the burden of showing prejudice only with respect to "technical errors," while the appellee bears the burden of
proving the harmlessness of violations of "substantial rights":
[T]he purpose of the bill in its final form was stated authoritatively to
be "to cast upon the party seeking a new trial the burden of showing
that any technical errors that he may complain of have affected his substantial rights, otherwise they are to be disregarded." But that this
burden does not extend to all errors appears from the statement which
follows immediately. "The proposed legislation affects only technical
errors. If the error is of such a character that its natural effect is to
prejudice a litigant's substantial rights, the burden of sustaining a verdict will, notwithstanding
this legislation rest upon the one who claims
41
under it."

39 Section 391 has since been superseded by 28 U.S.C. § 2111 (1988), discussed
supra note 20. See also infra notes 57-68 and accompanying text.
40 Compare, e.g., Valli v. United States, 94 F.2d 687, 690 (1st Cir. 1938) and Shuman v.
United States, 16 F.2d 457, 458 (5th Cir. 1927) and Armstrong v. United States, 16 F.2d
62, 65 (9th Cir. 1926) and Rich v. United States, 271 F. 566, 570 (8th Cir. 1921) (all
holding that statute assigns to appellant the burden of showing both error and prejudice) with Little v. United States, 73 F.2d 861, 865-67 (10th Cir. 1934) and Nicola v.
United States, 72 F.2d 780, 783 (3d Cir. 1934) and Gold v. United States, 26 F.2d 185,
186 (2d Cir. 1928) (all holding that the statute assigns the burden of proving harmlessness of violations of substantial rights to the party seeking to benefit from the error). For
a detailed analysis of the statute and the conflicting interpretations, see Little, 73 F.2d at
865-67.
41 Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 760-61 (1946) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 391
and its legislative history (quoted in Brecht, 113 S.Ct. at 1723-24 n. I (StevensJ., concurring))). Accord id. at 765 ("[W]hether the burden of establishing that the error affected
substantial rights, or, conversely, the burden of sustaining the verdict shall be imposed,
turns on whether the error is 'technical' or [conversely] is such that 'its natural effect is
to prejudice a litigant's substantial rights.' "). See also id. at 765 ("The inquiry... is...
whether the error itself had substantial influence. If so, or ifone is left in grave doubt, the
conviction cannot stand. " (emphasis added)). To like effect is an important passage in
Kotteakos describing the standard in terms of what the state would have to prove in order
to establish harmlessness:
If, when all is said and done, the conviction is sure that the error did not influence
the jury, or had but very slight effect, the verdict and the judgment should stand

....But if one cannot say with fair assurance ...that the judgment was not substan-

tially swayed by the error, it is impossible to conclude that substantial rights were
not affected.
Id. at 764-65 (emphasis added). As Kotteakos itself makes clear, and as Justice Stevens
emphasizes in his concurring opinion in Brecht, any division of errors into "technical"
and "substantial" categories must necessarily include constitutional violations in the lat-
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By incorporating the rule of Kotteakos, Brecht rather clearly
seems to endorse an allocation of the burden of proof of harmlessness to the state. Although that conclusion arguably should end the
matter, it is reinforced by examining the other sources on which
Brecht relies to define its new harmless error rule. As the following
discussion shows, each of those sources likewise identifies the state
as the appropriate bearer of the burden of proving harmlessness.
Besides Kotteakos, there are only three potential sources of an
allocation of the burden of proof that Brecht could be viewed as endorsing. The first is the Court's decision in United States v. Lane;42
the second is the harmless error provision in Rule 52(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure; the third is the federal harmless
error statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2111. On analysis, all three of these authorities either cycle analysis directly back to Kotteakos or independently allocate the burden to the state.
First, consider United States v. Lane. That decision's claim to
govern harmless error analysis in habeas corpus cases stems from a
single passage in Brecht-the passage, notably, to which Justice
White referred in expressing his opinion in dissent that the Court
had effectively allocated the burden of proof to the petitioner. That
passage reads as follows:
The imbalance of costs and benefits of applying the Chapman harmlesserror standard on collateral review counsels in favor of applying a less
onerous standard on habeas review of constitutional error. The Kotteakos standard, we believe, fills the bill. The test under Kotteakos is
whether the error "had substantial and injurious effect or influence in
determining the jury's verdict." 328 U.S. at 776 ....

Under this stan-

dard, habeas petitioners may obtain plenary review of their constitutional claims, but they are not entitled to habeas relief based on trial
error unless they can establish that it resulted in "actual prejudice."
See United States v. Lane, 474 U.S. 438, 449 ...

(1986). The Kotteakos

standard is thus better tailored to the nature and purpose of collateral
review, and more likely
to promote the considerations underlying our
43
recent habeas cases.
This passage, of course, is not prominently about Lane but rather
about Kotteakos. Nor is it about allocation of the burden of proof, but
rather about "[t]he Kotteakos standard" of proof; to the extent the
passage makes Lane relevant, it is explicit in explaining "this [Kotteakos] standard." This understanding of the relevance of Lane beter category. See Brecht, 113 S. Ct. at 1723-24 (Stevens, J., concurring); Kotteakos, 328
U.S. at 764-65 & n.19. See also United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499, 509-10 n.7
(1983).
42 474 U.S. 438 (1986).
43 Brecht, 113 S. Ct. at 1721-22.
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comes even clearer from the particular portion of Lane that the
Court quoted and cited in Brecht. That portion is as follows:
Under Rule 52(a) [of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure],
the harmless-error rule focuses on whether the error "affect[ed] substantial rights." In Kotteakos the Court construed a harmless error-statute with similar language, and observed: "The inquiry cannot be
merely whether there was enough to support the result, apart from the
phase affected by the error. It is rather, even so, whether the error
itself had substantial influence. If so, or if one is left in grave doubt,
the conviction cannot stand." 328 U.S., at 765.
Invoking the Kotteakos test, we hold that an error involving misjoinder "affects substantial rights" and requires reversal only if the
misjoinder results in actual prejudice because it "had substantial and
injurious
effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict." Id., at
44
776.
Like the passage in Brecht that cites it, this passage from Lane mainly
reprises Kotteakos' standard of review. Lane does not here (or elsewhere) directly take up the question of which party bears the burden
of proof.
Nor, pace Justice White in Brecht, can any allocation of the burden of proof be derived from Brecht's quotation of Lane in support of
a requirement that "habeas petitioners ... establish that [trial error]
resulted in 'actual prejudice.'"45 For in the quoted passage, Lane
quite explicitly equates the concept of "actual prejudice," not with
any allocation of the burden of proof, but rather with the same
" 'substantial and injurious effect or influence' " formulation of the
standard of proof that Brecht itself extracts from Kotteakos. 4 6 Together, therefore, the Brecht passage and the language from Lane
that the Brecht passage incorporates stand for the simple proposition
that, henceforth, harmless error will not be measured by Chapman's
"harmless beyond a reasonable doubt" standard, but rather by Kotteakos' "substantial and injurious effect or influence" standard
(which Brecht equates with Lane's notion of "actual prejudice," a
concept which Lane, in turn, equates with Kotteakos' "substantial and
injurious effect or influence" standard). More simply, under Brecht,
as under Lane and Kotteakos, the harmless error standard is whether
the error "'had substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict.' "47
Lane, 474 U.S. at 449 (footnote omitted).
Brecht, 113 S. Ct. at 1722 (quoting Lane, 474 U.S. at 449).
Id. at 1713-14 (quoting Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 776 (1946). See
also supra note 15 and accompanying text.
47 Brecht, 113 S. Ct. at 1722 (quoting Kotteakos, 328 U.S. at 776); Lane, 474 U.S. at 449
(quoting Kotteakos, 328 U.S. at 776). Indeed, by making the legal error at issue in Lane
("misjoinder") the subject of the critical sentence, and "results in actual prejudice" the
44
45
46
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On examination, however, the passage from Lane that Brecht incorporates may have an important, if implicit, bearing on the allocation of the burden of proof. For one thing, the passage makes
relevant (though not decisive) a type of showing that only the state
would have an incentive to make-that "'there was enough [evidence] to support the result.' "48 For another thing, quoting Kotteakos, the passage states that " 'the conviction cannot stand' " in
either of two situations: if the record convinces the decisionmaker
that the " 'error ... had substantial influence' "; or if the record is so
evenly divided that the decisionmaker " 'is left in grave doubt' " on
the question. 4 9 Under any fair burden of proof (i.e., a preponderance of the evidence test), the party that loses in the event of a tie is
the party with the burden of proof. Consequently, Lane and Kotteakos'-and hence Brecht's-identification of the state as the loser, in
the event the decisionmaker is in doubt about an error's "substantial influence," clearly assumes that the burden of proof is on the
state. That Lane picked up this assumption about the allocation of
the burden of proof from Kotteakos is hardly surprising. Although
Lane was not a burden of proof case, Kotteakos was, and it clearly
50
allocated the burden to the state.
The passage from Lane on which Brecht relies provides an even
more powerful clue as to where the burden of proof should lie. Lane
passive verb and object, the passage from Lane on which Brecht relies clearly leaves open
the question that Brecht's usage of "habeas petitioners" as the subject and "establish
.actual prejudice'" as the verb and object might otherwise be thought to answernamely, which party must show that the error did or did not "result in" prejudice.
There is a danger, in any event, in according too much significance to the phrase
"actual prejudice." As the Court explained in a harmless-error decision announced
soon after Brecht, the phrase "actual prejudice" is a term of art with little application to
the question at hand. Thus, "actual prejudice" does not describe an allocation of the
burden, or even a standard, for demonstrating harm or harmlessness. Rather, the Court
uses that term simply to distinguish one general mode of harmless error review (in
which the issue of harm or harmlessness actually must be the subject of inquiry, based
on the facts and circumstances of the particular case) from another mode of such review-"prejudice per se"--in which prejudice need not be the subject of inquiry because
it is categorically presumed. See United States v. Olano, 113 S. Ct. 1770, 1778 (1993)
(contrasting "actual prejudice" analysis, which applies to errors that are reversible only
following a "specific analysis" of their effect on the actual proceeding, and "per se prejudicial" analysis, which applies to "errors that should be presumed prejudicial [even] if
the defendant cannot make a specific showing of prejudice"); see also id. at 1781 ("On
this record, we are not persuaded that the instant violation ... was actually prejudicial.
Nor will we presume prejudice for purposes of the.., analysis here."); id. at 1782 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (violations subject to "actual prejudice" review result in relief only if
there is "a prejudicial impact on a particular defendant"; errors subject to a presumpti6n of prejudice require reversal regardless of such impact).
48 Lane, 474 U.S. at 449 (quoting Kotteakos, 328 U.S. at 765).
49 Id.

50 See supra notes 39-41 and accompanying text.
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interpreted the harmless error rule in Criminal Procedure Rule
52(a), which Lane (in the passage that Brecht cites) equates with Kotteakos' harmless error rule. By endorsing Lane's equation of Kotteakos' "substantial and injurious effect or influence" test-which
Brecht adopts-with Rule 52(a)'s "affect[ed] substantial rights"
test, 51 Brecht adds Rule 52 (a) to the list of authoritative determinants
of an appropriate allocation of the burden of proof. In so doing,
moreover, Brecht points emphatically to the state as the bearer of
that burden because the federal courts have traditionally given the
52
burden of proving Rule 52(a) harmlessness to the government.
The leading discussion of that point is a Supreme Court decision,
United States v. Olano,53 announced nearly simultaneously with Brecht.
In Olano, the Court discussed similarities and differences between the harmless error and plain error provisions found in Rules
54
52(a) and 52(b) of the Criminal Procedure Rules, respectively.
Among other things, that discussion addressed the allocation of the
burden of proof under the two provisions-and in the process
clearly confirmed the practice of requiring the government to prove
harmlessness:
The third and final limitation on appellate authority under Rule 52(b)
is that the plain error "affec[t] substantial rights." This is the same
language employed in [the harmless error provision in] Rule 52(a),
and in most cases it means that the error must have been prejudicial
.... When the defendant has made a timely objection to an error and
[the harmless error provision in] Rule 52(a) applies, the Court of Appeals normally engages in a specific analysis of the District Court record-a so-called "harmless error" inquiry-to determine whether the
error was prejudicial. Rule 52(b) normally requires the same kind of
inquiry, with one important difference: [Under the plain error provision in Rule 52(b), i]t is the defendant rather than the Government
51 The majority opinion in Lane is one of many authorities for the proposition that
both the harmless error statute interpreted in Kotteakos and Rule 52(a) incorporate the
same harmless error rule. A particularly comprehensive treatment of the same conclusion appears injustice Brennan's separate opinion in the same case. See Lane, 474 U.S.
at 454-55 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). See also id. at 470
(Stevens,j., dissenting); Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 757 n.9 (1946) (Rule
52(a) is "'a restatement of " the statute interpreted in Kotteakos, 28 U.S.C. § 391 (quoting Advisory Committee Notes to the Rules of Criminal Procedure for the District
Courts of the United States 43 (1945))); Bihn v. United States, 328 U.S. 633, 638 (1946);
other authority cited infra note 68.
52 See generally 3A CHARLES A. WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 854, at
304 n.17 (2d ed. 1982).
53 113 S. Ct. 1770 (1993).
54 FED. R. CRIM. P. 52 provides as follows:
(a) HARMLESS ERROR. Any error, irregularity or variance which does not
affect substantial rights shall be disregarded.
(b) PLAIN ERROR. Plain errors or defects affecting substantial rights may be
noticed although they were not brought to the attention of the court.
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who bears the burden of persuasion with respect to prejudice. In most
cases, the Court of Appeals cannot correct the forfeited error unless
the defendant shows that the error was prejudicial .... This burdenshifting is dictated by a subtle but important difference in language
between the two parts of Rule 52: while Rule 52(a) precludes errorcorrection only if the error "does not affect substantial rights," Rule
52(b) authorizes no remedy unless the error does "affec[t] substantial
rights."5 5
Olano is important not only because of its clear allocation to the
government of the burden of proving harmlessness but also because
of its "subtle," text-based rationale for that allocation: The Court
derived Rule 52(a)'s allocation of the burden of proof from the rule's
description of the standard of proof in terms of a negative showing
that the party responsible for the error (the government), and not the
party affected by the error (the appellant), would be expected to
make-namely, that the error "'does
not affect substantial
rights.' "56 Applied to the final potential source of an allocation of
the burden of proof that can be derived from Brecht, 28 U.S.C.
§ 2111, this same interpretive technique makes those sources' endorsement of an allocation of the burden to the state unanimous.
According to Brecht, "the Kotteakos standard" it adopts to govern
harmless error analysis in habeas corpus cases "isgrounded in the
federal harmless error statute," 28 U.S.C. § 2111, which states that
"on the hearing of any appeal or writ of certiorari in any case, the
court shall give judgment after an examination of the record without
regard to errors or defects which do not affect the substantial rights
57
of the parties."
As Brecht's quotation of section 2111 makes clear, the statute,
like Rule 52(a), states the standard of review in terms of a negative
showing that the state, not the petitioner, would be expected to
make: "'I[T]he court shall give judgment ... without regard to er55 Olano, 113 S. Ct. at 1777-78 (citations omitted). Accord id. at 1781:
In sum, respondents have not met their burden of showing prejudice under [the
plain error provision in] Rule 52(b). Whether the Government could have met its
burden of showing the absence ofprudice, under [the harmless error provision in] Rule
52(a), if respondents had not forfeited their claim of error, is not at issue here. This
is a plain error case, and it is respondents who must persuade the appellate court
that the [error] . . .was prejudicial.
(emphasis added). See also id. at 1782 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
56 Id. at 1778 (quoting FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(a)) (emphasis added by the Court).
57 Brecht v. Abrahamson, 113 S. Ct. 1710, 1718 (1993) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2111)
(footnote omitted). See also id. at 1722 ("[B]ecause the Kotteakos standard is grounded in
the federal harmless-error rule (28 U.S.C. § 2111), federal courts may turn to an existing body of case law in applying it."); id. at 1718 n.7; id. at 1723 (Stevens, J.,concurring) (the Kotteakos standard "accords with the statutory rule for reviewing other trial
errors that affect substantial rights").
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rors... which do not affect the substantial rights of the parties.' "58
Under the interpretive "dictate[s]" of Olano, therefore, this statement of the standard in terms of a showing the government, and not
the petitioner, would be expected to make gives "the Government
59
... [the] burden of showing the absence of prejudice."
Consideration of section 211 l's origins produces the same conclusion, by once again cycling interpretation back to the Court's
clear and ubiquitously influential allocation of the burden to the
government in Kotteakos. Kotteakos construed the then-existing
harmless error statute, 28 U.S.C. § 391, which provided:
On the hearing of any appeal, certiorari, writ of error, or motion for a
new trial, in any case, civil or criminal, the court shall give judgment
after an examination of the entire record before the court, without regard to technical errors, defects, or exceptions which do not affect the
60
substantial rights of the parties.
Congress repealed section 391 in 1948 and replaced it in 1949 with
section 2111, which was nearly identical to the statute construed in
Kotteakos but for the deletion of the term "technical: ' 61 "On the
hearing of any appeal or writ of certiorari in any case, the court shall
give judgment after an examination of the record without regard to
errors or defects which do not affect the substantial rights of the
parties."
62
Unless deletion of the word "technical" has any significance,
58

Id. (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2111 (emphasis added)).

59 Olano, 113 S. Ct. at 1778, 1781.
60 See Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 757 (1946); see also Brecht, 113 S.Ct.

at 1718 n.7.
61 See Brecht, 113 S. Ct. at 1718 n.7 ("Congress tinkered with the language of § 391
when it enacted § 2111 in its place in 1949, . . . [leaving] untouched the phrase 'affect
the substantial rights of the parties' . . . [but] delet[ing] . . . the word 'technical.' ");

United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499, 509-10 n.7 (1983).
62 The argument that deletion of the word "technical" is important might run as
follows: Although Kotteakos assigned appellants the burden of proof only as to "technical" errors, those in fact were the only errors covered by section 391. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 391 (1925-26 ed.) (forbidding relief based on "technical errors, defects, or exceptions
which do not affect the substantial rights of the parties") (emphasis added). Arguably,
therefore, Congress' broadening of the set of errors to which the statute applied to include all "errors or defects which do not affect the substantial rights of the parties" also
broadened the scope of the errors as to which the appellant bore the burden of proving
harm.
The central flaw in this argument is that it inaccurately assumes that section 391
applied only to "technical" errors, leaving all other errors reversible per se, even when
they did not affect the "substantial rights of the parties." In fact, neither Kotteakos nor
other contemporaneous harmless error cases arising under section 391 read the statute
to apply only to "technical" errors. Rather, those cases interpreted the statute and its
legislative history to give federal courts the power to refuse to grant relief on any (at
least nonconstitutional),error that "d[id] not affect the substantial rights of the parties,"
including concededly nontechnical error ofjust the sort that Kotteakos itself reviewed. See,
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section 2111 is simply the successor to section 391.63 And, if so, the
Court's authoritative construction of the earlier statute in Kotteakos,
including as to the allocation of the burden of proof to the government, also would govern its construction of the later, existing
statute.
Moreover, the Court repeatedly has declined to attach significance to Congress' "tinker[ing]" with the federal harmless error
statute between 1948, when section 391 was repealed, and 1949,
when section 2111 was adopted. 64 Rather, the Court has attributed
section 391's repeal to Congress' mistaken belief that the harmless
error provisions in the Federal Rules of Criminal and Civil Procedure made the statute superfluous. It also has attributed section
211 1's "reenactment" of section 391 (renumbered because of the
intervening revision of the Judicial Code) to Congress' realization a
year later that the preexisting statute had to be revived because error under review in the federal courts could arise in contexts other
than those governed by the Civil or Criminal Rules. 65
Likewise, in Lane, the majority clearly assumed that sections 391
and 2111-as well as Criminal Rule 52(a)-were equivalent and
governed by the Court's analysis in Kotteakos. 66 Discussing the relee.g., Kotteakos, 328 U.S. at 760-61, 764-65; Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 82-84
(1935) (finding concededly nontechnical violation harmless and denying relief under
section 391). The only import the Court assigned the word "technical" thus was to shift
the burden of proof, which usually was borne by the government, to the appellant in
cases involving error fitting that description. See Kotteakos, 328 U.S. at 760-61; supra
notes 39-41 and accompanying text. By deleting the word "technical," therefore, Congress simply conformed the new statute to the already evolved practice under the old
statute of subjecting all (at least nonconstitutional) error to harmless error analysis. See
United States v. Seidel, 620 F.2d 1006, 1013 (4th Cir. 1980); Brulay v. United States,
383 F.2d 345, 351 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 986 (1967). The only other signifi-

cance that might be assigned to Congress' removal of the word "technical" is an intention to remove any occasion--of the sort provided by the word's inclusion in the prior
statute-for giving appellants the burden of proof. Whether or not the latter intention
was present, however, there is simply nothing in the change from section 391 as explicated in Kotteakos to section 2111 that indicates the intention to modify Kotteakos' allocation to the government of the burden of proving harmlessness for all errors save those
designated as "technical." See also infra notes 64-68 and accompanying text (discussing
legislative history of section 2111 and caselaw interpreting it, and concluding that section 2111 effected no substantive change in section 391).
63 Brecht, 113 S. Ct. at 1718 n.7 (describing section 391 as "§ 2111's statutory
predecessor").
64 Id.

65 Hasting, 461 U.S. at 509-10 n.7.

66 See United States v. Lane, 474 U.S. 438, 444 (1986) (Rule 52(a) and section 2111
"similarly instruct[ ]" courts on the treatment of harmless error); id. at 446, 448 (discussing Shaffer v. United States, 362 U.S. 511, 517 (1960), and concluding that Kotteakos
governs analysis under section 2111, notwithstanding that section's replacement of section 391 and Congress' deletion of the word "technical"); id. at 449 (Kotteakos governs
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vant legislative history, which confirms section 211 1's intention simply to reenact section 391,Justice Brennan's influential concurrence
in Lane explained the basis for treating those statutes and Rule 52(a)
as equivalent, and thus as governed by Kotteakos:
[Section 391] ...provided in part ...[that] ".

.

. the court shall

give judgment ....without regard to technical errors, defects or exceptions which do not affect the substantial rights of the parties." 28
U.S.C. § 391 (1925-1926 ed.) ....

In 1949, this provision was reen-

acted in its current form as 28 U.S.C. § 2111, and now instructs appellate courts to "give judgment after an examination of the record
without regard to errors or defects which do not affect the substantial
rights of the parties." [Section 391] was also incorporated in the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, and Rule 52(a) provides that "[a]ny
error, defect, irregularity or variance which does not affect substantial
rights shall be disregarded." ... Although § 2111 and Rule 52(a) re-

fer to "errors or defects" without the qualifying word "technical," this
change did not alter the substantive legal test. See H. R. Rep. No.
352, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., 18 (1949) (§ 2111 "incorporates" former
harmless-error statute); Advisory Committee's Notes on Fed. Rule
Crim. Proc. 52(a), 18 U.S.C. App., p. 657 (Rule is a "restatement of
existing law").67

Not surprisingly, therefore, Brecht itself concluded that "the enactment of § 2111 did not alter the basis for the harmless-error standard in Kotteakos." 6 8 On its face and as repeatedly interpreted in the
analysis under Rule 52(a), though Kotteakos arose under section 391, not Rule 52(a));
Bihn v. United States, 328 U.S. 633, 638 n.3 (1946) (Rule 52(a) "effects no change in the
[statutory] harmless-error rule" previously governed by section 391).
67 Lane, 474 U.S. at 454-55 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(cited approvingly in United States v. Olano, 113 S. Ct. 1770, 1778 (1993)). See United
States v. Olano, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 1776 (1993) (offering similar interpretation of Rule
52(a)).
68 Brecht, 113 S.Ct. at 1718 n.7. See United States v. Rivera, 900 F.2d 1462, 1470
(10th Cir. 1990) (legislative history of section 2111 indicates no intention to change
section 391 substantively).
The lower court caselaw under section 2111 is not as clear as it might be in allocating the burden of proof, but on the whole it bears out the analysis above. A rare comprehensive treatment of the issue in Rivera, supra, concludes-based on a discussion of
the text and history of section 2111 and its antecedents, Rule 52(a), Kotteakos, and prior
circuit precedent-that "except possibly for minor, technical errors for which there is no
reasonable possibility that the verdict could have been affected, the government ordinarily has the burden of proving that a non-constitutional error was harmless." Id. at 1469
n.4. More typically, the decisions simply make brief and unconsidered allusions to the
allocation of the burden, evidencing a considerable amount of confusion. Compare
United States v. Flores, 968 F.2d 1366, 1372 (Ist Cir. 1992) (government's attempt to
prove harmlessness found unconvincing) and United States v. Patrick, 959 F.2d 991,
1002-03 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (relief granted because court was not persuaded by government's showing of harmlessness) and United States v. Tyler, 943 F.2d 420, 423 (4th Cir.
1991) (reversal required if there is a "grave doubt" that the error did not have a substantial influence) and United States v.Jefferson, 925 F.2d 1242, 1255 & n.15 (10th Cir.),
cert denied, 112 S.Ct. 238 (1991) (government satisfied its burden of proving harmless-
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Supreme Court, therefore, section 2111 can only fairly be read to
recodify Kotteakos' allocation to the government of the burden of
proving harmlessness.
What Justice Blackmun wrote in a different harmless error context some years ago aptly encapsulates the law governing the allocation of the burden of proving harmlessness under Kotteakos and the
ness of nonconstitutional error) and United States v. Studley, 892 F.2d 518, 530 (7th Cir.
1989) (government bears burden of showing that error had no substantial influence or
effect on the verdict) and United States v. Hays, 872 F.2d 582, 588 (5th Cir. 1989) (stating standard in terms of showing state would be expected to make; error requires reversal unless court can "conclude that the error had no effect, or only a slight effect on the
jury's decision") and Government of Virgin Islands v. Bedford, 671 F.2d 758, 762 (3d
Cir. 1982) (requiring reversal unless the government proves that there is no "reasonable
possibility" that the error had no substantial effect) with United States v. Hill, 976 F.2d
132, 143 (3d Cir. 1992) (discussed below) and United States v. Killough, 848 F.2d 1523,
1527 (1 lth Cir. 1988) (discussed below) and United States v. Kopelciw, 815 F.2d 1235,
1238 (8th Cir. 1987) (discussed below) and United States v. Lawal, 736 F.2d 5, 9-10 (2d
Cir. 1984) (relief denied because appellant failed to show that error was harmful) and
Howard v. Gonzales, 658 F.2d 352, 357 (5th Cir. 1981) (party asserting error has burden
of proving harm).
After excluding discussions of the issue that are clearly faulty, however-for example, discussions that, contrary to Olano, understand Rule 52(a) to assign the burden to
the defendant, see, e.g., Hill, 976 F.2d at 142, or that, contrary to Kotteakos and Olano,
simply assume that the appellant, as the moving party in the assertion of error, should
bear the burden of proving harm even after proving error, see, e.g., Killough, 848 F.2d at
1527 and Kopelciw, 815 F.2d at 1238-the preponderant lower court view seems to be
that the government bears the burden of proof.
At least seven post-Brecht habeas corpus decisions expressly allocate the burden of
proof. Three of these decisions assign the burden to the state. See Stoner v. Sowders,
997 F.2d 209, 213 (6th Cir. 1993); Lowery v. Collins, 996 F.2d 770, 773 (5th Cir. 1993);
Smith v. Dixon, 996 F.2d 667, 676 n.13 (4th Cir. 1993). The other four decisions assign
the burden to the petitioner, although all of them do so based on a misreading of the
passage from Brecht that is discussed supra notes 43-47 and accompanying text. SeeJeffries v. Blodgett, 5 F.3d 1180, 1190 (9th Cir. 1993) (quoting Brecht, 113 S. Ct. at 1722)
(quoting Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 776 (1946)); Tagne v. Richards, 3
F.3d 1133, 1140 (7th Cir. 1993) (quoting Brecht, 113 S. Ct. at 1722); O'Neal v. Morris, 3
F.3d 143, 145 (6th Cir. 1993), cert. granted, 114 S. Ct. 1396 (1994) (citing Brecht, 113 S.
Ct. at 1722); Castillo v. Stainer, 997 F.2d 669, 669 (9th Cir. 1993) (quoting Brecht, 113 S.
Ct. at 1714, and Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 776 (1946). Moreover, one of
these decisions, O'Neal v. Morris, assigns the burden to the petitioner in dicta despite a
previous holding in the same Circuit that interpreted Brecht as assigning the burden to
the state. Compare O'Neal, 3 F.3d at 145, with Stoner, 997 F.2d at 213. Two additional
decisions use formulations of the standard that might be understood also to allocate the
burden of proof, although any such allocation that can be discerned in these decisions is
based once again on a misreading of the passage from Brecht that is discussed supra notes
43-47 and accompanying text. See Henry v. Estelle, 993 F.2d 1423, 1426 (9th Cir. 1993)
("a federal court will not reverse the conviction unless the petitioner shows that the
error 'had a substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict' ") (quoting Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 776 (1946) and citing Brecht,
113 S. Ct. at 1721-22); Cumbie v. Singletary, 991 F.2d 715, 724 (11th Cir. 1993) ("the
relevant inquiry is whether [the petitioner] can demonstrate that he was 'actually
prejudiced' by [the error]" (quoting Lane, 474 U.S. at 449).
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other authoritative sources to which Brecht refers-United States v.
Lane, Rule 52(a), section 2111, and the cases interpreting them:
"Every harmless-error standard that this Court has employed ...
shares two salient features .

.

. [the first being that,] once serious

error has been identified, the burden shifts to the beneficiary of the
error to show that the conviction was not tainted." 69 Chapman v.
Californiareached the same conclusion in its discussion of the allocation of the burden of proof, which, unlike its discussion of the standard of proof, had recourse to Kotteakos and the entire American
common law tradition in regard to harmless error:
Certainly error, constitutional error, in illegally admitting highly prejudicial evidence or comments, casts on someone other than the person
prejudiced by it a burden to show that it was harmless. It is for that
reason that the original common-law harmless-error rule put the burden on the beneficiary of the error either to prove that there was no
70
injury or to suffer a reversal of his erroneously obtained judgment.
Finally, none of the jurisprudential interests that led the Brecht
Court to differentiate habeas corpus proceedings from direct appeal
justify a change in the longstanding and uniform federal practice of
allocating to the party shown to be seriously at fault the burden of
proving that its error did not affect the proceedings. Indeed, in applying the other habeas corpus defenses that the Supreme Court
and Congress have devised in service of those same jurisprudential
interests-for example, exhaustion of state remedies, nonretroactivity, and procedural default-the Supreme Court and the lower federal courts have repeatedly recognized that interests of finality,
comity, and federalism do not justify absolving the responding party
of its traditional burdens of pleading and proving the defenses on
71
which it relies.
III.

PER SE PREJUDICIAL ERRORS

In conducting harmless error analysis of constitutional violations in direct appeal and habeas corpus cases, the Court repeatedly
has reaffirmed that "[slome constitutional violations . . . by their

very nature cast so much doubt on the fairness of the trial process
that, as a matter of law, they can never be considered harmless."' 72
Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 197 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967)'(citing 1 WIGMORE, EvIDENCE § 21
(3d ed. 1940)).
71 See LIEBMAN & HERTZ, supra note *, §§ 22A.3, 23.3a, 23A.2, 24.2a, 25.3a, 26.3a
(1993 Cum. Supp.).
72 Satterwhite v. Texas, 486 U.S. 249, 256 (1988). Accord Sullivan v. Louisiana, 113 S.
Ct. 2078, 2081 (1993) ("Although most constitutional errors have been held amenable
69
70

to harmless-error analysis ... some will always invalidate the conviction"); id. at 2083-84
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In Arizona v. Fulminante73 a five-justice majority of the Court 74 elucidated this rule ofper se prejudice (sometimes called the "rule of automatic reversal" 75 ) by distinguishing between the concepts of
"structural" and "trial" error: "structural defects in the constitution of the trial mechanism" are per se prejudicial; 76 trial errors occurring "during the presentation of the case to the jury" are subject
to harmless error analysis. 77
Although in Brecht the Court changed the standard that applies
in habeas corpus cases for assessing the harmlessness of constitutional "trial errors," 78 it did not change-and in fact reaffirmed-its
longstanding doctrine treating "structural" error as not subject to
harmless error analysis and accordingly as prejudicial (hence reversible) per se:
Trial error "occur[s] during the presentation of the case to the jury,"
and is amenable to harmless-error analysis because it "may .

.

. be

quantitatively assessed in the context of other evidence presented in
(Rehnquist, C.J., concurring); United States v. Olano, 113 S. Ct. 1770, 1778 (1993);
Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 577 (1986) ("some constitutional errors require reversal
without regard to the evidence in the particular case ... [because they] render a trial
fundamentally unfair"); Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 263-64 (1986); Chapman, 386
U.S. at 23 ("there are some constitutional rights so basic to a fair trial that their infraction can never be treated as harmless error").
73 111 S. Ct. 1246 (1991).
74 Fulminante was decided by a shifting majority in which Justice White spoke for the
Court on certain issues and ChiefJustice Rehnquist on others. With regard to the issue
discussed in the text-the analytic framework for applying the rule of automatic reversal-Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion was a majority opinion, joined by Justices
O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Souter. See id. at 1263-66.
75 Id. at 1257 (opinion of White, J.). See also Satterwhite, 486 U.S. at 257 ("automatic

rule of reversal").
76 Fulminante, 111 S. Ct. at 1265. See also id. ("structural defect[s] affecting the framework within which the trial proceeds, rather than simply an error in the trial process
itself").
77 Id. at 1264-65. Examples of "trial error" include, generally, (i) unconstitutional
"outside intrusions on the jury," see, e.g., United States v. Olano, 113 S. Ct. 1770, 1780
(1993); Patton v. Yount, 467 U.S. 1025, 1031-35 (1984); (ii) violations of the rule of
Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976), which forbids the state to tell suspects upon arrest
that they have the right to remain silent, then to use the suspects' post-arrest silence
against them as proof of their guilt, see Brecht v. Abrahamson, 113 S. Ct. 1710, 1717
(1993); (iii) violations of the rule of Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510 (1979), forbidding instructions requiring jurors to presume the presence of elements of an offense, see
Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 577-79 (1986); (iv) violations of the rule forbidding
prosecutorial comment on the defendant's failure to testify, see Chapman v. California,
386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967); and, more controversially, (v) introduction at trial of involuntary
confessions, see Fulminante, 111 S. Ct. at 1265-66. Cf id. at 1254-55 (opinion of White, J.)
("The majority . . . draw[s] . . . a meaningless dichotomy between 'trial errors' and
Istructural defects' in the trial process ....
This effort [to distinguish the two types of
errors] fails, for our jurisprudence on harmless error has not classified so neatly the
errors at issue.").
78 See supra notes 1-15 and accompanying text.
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order to determine [the effect it had on the trial]." At the other end of
the spectrum of constitutional errors lie "structural defects in the constitution of the trial mechanism, which defy analysis by 'harmless-error' standards ... ." The existence of such defects-deprivation of the
right to counsel, for example-requires automatic reversal of the conviction because they infect the entire trial process.
For the foregoing reasons, then, we hold that the Kotteakos harmless-error standard applies in determining whether habeas relief must
79
be granted because of constitutional error of the trial type.
Thus, even in habeas corpus proceedings adjudicated under Brecht,
"structural" errors, as opposed to "errors of the trial type," are always considered "prejudicial" and accordingly are reversible per se.
Even more recently, in United States v. Olano,8 0 the Court seems
to have divided the universe of constitutional errors into three,
rather than two, categories for purposes of harmlessness analysisor, perhaps, the Court has divided the category of automatically reversible errors into two subcategories. According to this taxonomy,
"structural errors" must "be corrected regardless of their effect"
on
the trial because they violate" 'basic protections [without which] ...
no criminal punishment may be regarded as fundamentally fair.' "81
As to such errors-for example, the denial of an attorney or a jury,
or other failures to "complete the proceeding" 8 2-the presence or
absence of prejudice is irrelevant.8 3 A second category of automatically reversible errors is subject to reversal only upon a finding of
prejudice, but "should be presumed prejudicial if the defendant
cannot make a specific showing of prejudice."8 4 Automatic reversal
upon a finding of these errors-a single attorney's joint representation of criminal defendants with conflicting interests, for example 8 5-occurs not so much because of the fundamentality of the
right that was violated, but instead because prejudice is simultane86
ously so likely to occur and so difficult to prove.
79 Brecht, 113 S. Ct. at 1717, 1722 (quoting Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 308-09, and discussing Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750 (1946)) (emphasis added); accord id. at
1723 (Stevens, J. concurring).
80 113 S. Ct. at 1770.
81 Id. at 1778 (quoting Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 310).
82 See Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 577 (1986) (cataloguing such rights).
83 As to such rights, the violation " 'affect[s] substantial rights' independent of its
prejudicial impact." Olano, 113 S. Ct. at 1779.
84 Id. at 1778.
85 See Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 489-91 (1978). See also Olano, 113 S. Ct. at
1779; Riggins v. Nevada, 112 S. Ct. 1810, 1816-17 (1992) (refusing to engage in prejudice analysis and effectively applying prejudice per se standard to reverse conviction of
defendant who was unconstitutionally forced to take antipsychotic medication during

trial).
86

See, e.g., Olano, 113 S. Ct. at 1783 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("some defects ...

are
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Opinions of the Court designate the rights listed below as
"structural" constitutional rights that are "so basic to a fair trial that
their infraction can never be treated as harmless error," or at least
as so prone to prejudice that, when violated, prejudice should be
87
presumed:
(1) The right to counsel at critical stages of the proceedings before
and at trial and on appeal,8 8 including:
(a) the right to effective assistance of counsel;8 9 and
(b) the right to representation by an attorney who does not simultaneously represent another criminal client with a conflicting
interest.90
(2) The right to self-representation. 992'
(3) The right to an impartial judge.
(4) The right to trial by jury,9 3 which encompasses:
subject to reversal regardless of whether prejudice can be shown . . .because it is so
difficult to measure their effects on ajury's decision"); Brecht v. Abrahamson, 113 S. Ct.
1710, 1717 (1993) (discussing "defects ...which defy analysis by 'harmless-error' standards" (quoting Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 290 (1991))); Sullivan v. Louisiana, 113 S. Ct. 2078, 2081-82 (1993); Riggins, 112 S. Ct. at 1816-17. Olano delineates
the three categories of errors-(1) errors that so thoroughly impugn the structure of the
criminal process that their commission is reversible apart from prejudice; (2) errors as to
which prejudice is required to justify reversal but is presumed; and (3) trial errors subject to case-specific harmless error analysis-in the following passage: "[tihe presence
of alternate jurors during jury deliberations is not the kind of error that 'affect[s] substantial rights' independent of its prejudicial impact [category (1)]. Nor have respondents made a specific showing of prejudice [category (3)]. Finally, we see no reason to
presume prejudice here [category (2)]." Olano, 113 S.Ct. at 1779; see also id. at 1783
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
87 Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 23 (1967). For compilations of prior cases
holding errors to be per se prejudicial, see, e.g., Arizona v. Fulminante, 111 S.Ct. 1246,
1256-57 (1991); id. at 1261-66 (majority opinion of Rehnquist, CJ.); Satterwhite v.
Texas, 486 U.S. 249, 256 (1988); Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 577-78 (1986). See also
LiEBMAN & HERTZ, supra note *, § 22A.7 n.34 and accompanying text (1993 Cum.
Supp.).
88 See, e.g., Sullivan, 113 S.Ct. at 2081 ("total deprivation of the right to counsel");
Brecht, 113 S.Ct. at 1717; Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 294 (opinion of White, J.) (denial of
counsel at trial or preliminary hearing "can never be harmless error"); Penson v. Ohio,
488 U.S. 75, 88-89 (1988) (actions of counsel effectively leaving defendant without appellate representation can never be harmless error); Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S.
673, 681 (1986); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); see also United States v.
Allen, 895 F.2d 1577, 1580 (10th Cir. 1990) (failure to inform defendants of dangers of
self-representation at trial can never be harmless).
89 See, e.g., United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 654-57 (1984).
90 See Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 489-91 (1978).
91 See, e.g., Sullivan, 113 S. Ct. at 2081; Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 310 (majority opinion
of Rehnquist, CJ.); McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 177-78 n.8 (1984); United States
v. Betancourt-Arretuche, 933 F.2d 89, 94 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S.Ct. 421 (1991);
Dorman v. Wainwright, 798 F.2d 1358, 1369 (11th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 951
(1987).
92 See, e.g., Sullivan, 113 S.Ct. at 2081; Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 577-78 (1986);
Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 523 (1927).
93 See, e.g., Rose, 478 U.S. at 577-78.
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(a) the right to ajury, 94 including a capital sentencing jury,9 5 that
is impartial and is not organized to convict or to condemn; and
(b) the right to a grand and petit jury selected in a representative
manner free of racial discrimination. 96
97
(5) The right to a public trial.
(6) The right to a "jury verdict within the meaning of the Sixth
Amendment," which, in light of the Fifth Amendment requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, is the right to "a jury
verdict of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." 9 8 This right includes:
(a) the full protection of the reasonable doubt standard at trial,9 9
including the right to a jury instruction on the state's burden
to prove all charges beyond a reasonable doubt' 0 0 that does
not water down the protection afforded by the "reasonable
doubt" standard;' 0 '
10 2
(b) a ban on "direct[ed] .. .verdict[s] for the State";
(c) the right to an instruction on each element of the offense of
which the prisoner has been convicted;10 104 3 and
(d) the right to a unanimous jury verdict.
(7) The right, in capital cases, to a sentencing process that adequately
"narrows" the categories of offenses and offenders eligible for
94 See, e.g., id.; Thompson v. White, 680 F.2d 1173, 1174 (8th Cir. 1982) (per curiam),
cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1177 (1983); Hines v. Enomoto, 658 F.2d 667, 674 (9th Cir. 1981);
Huffinan v. Wainwright, 651 F.2d 347, 350 (5th Cir. 1981).
95 See, e.g., Gray v. Mississippi, 481 U.S. 648, 668 (1987) (plurality opinion) (harmless
error analysis not applicable to violations of rule of Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S.
510 (1968), forbidding automatic exclusion from capital sentencingjuries of individuals
who have conscientious scruples against death penalty but nonetheless can follow the
law).
96 See, e.g., Amadeo v. Zant, 486 U.S. 214, 228 n.6 (1988) (state concedes that "finding ... of intentional racial discrimination in the composition of the master jury lists
satisfies the requirement of prejudice"); Rose, 478 U.S. at 577-78; Batson v. Kentucky,
476 U.S. 79, 98-99 (1986); Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28, 36 & n.9 (1986); Vasquez v.
Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 264 (1986).
97 See, e.g., Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 310 (1991); Waller v. Georgia, 467
U.S. 39, 49 n.9 (1984).
98 Sullivan v. Louisiana, 113 S.Ct. 2078, 2081-83 (1993).
99 Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 291 (citing Cool v. United States, 409 U.S. 100, 104 (1972),
and In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970)).
100 Id.; Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 320 n.14 (1979); Lanigan v. Maloney, 853
F.2d 40, 49-50 (1st Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1007 (1989) (failure to instruct jury
as to reasonable doubt standard is reversible without regard to showing of prejudice).
101 See Sullivan, 113 S.Ct. at 2081.
102 Id. at 2080.
103 See id. at 2084 (Rehnquist, CJ., concurring) (suggesting that "remov[ing] an element of the offense from the jury's consideration" can never be harmless (citing Rose v.
Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 579 n.7, 580 n.8 (1986)). See also Teel v. Tennessee, 498 U.S. 1007
(1990) (White, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (certiorarishould be granted to decide "whether harmless error analysis applies when ajury is not instructed on an essential element of the offense"; "[s]everal courts of appeal have held that error resulting
from a failure to give proper instructions on the essential elements of an offense cannot
be harmless").
104 See, e.g., Sincox v. United States, 571 F.2d 876, 879 (5th Cir. 1978).
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capital punishment10 5 and that requires10 sentencer
consideration
6
of all relevant mitigating circumstances.
(8) In States in which death sentences are based on the sentencer's
weighing of aggravating and mitigating evidence, the right to have
a state court or the sentencer reweigh the proper aggravating and
mitigating factors in the event that the sentencer premised the
original sentence on an aggravating factor later determined
to be
law' 0 7 or state law.' 0 8
invalid as a matter of federal
09
(9) The right to an appeal.'
This list is not exhaustive, 110 and the lower courts have expanded it
105 See, e.g., Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356, 362-63, 365-66 (1988) (by implication); Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 427-28, 433 (1980) (by implication).
106 See, e.g., Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 328 (1989) (by implication); Hitchcock v.
Dugger, 481 U.S. 393, 398-99 (1987) (by implication); Skipper v. South Carolina, 476
U.S. 1, 8-9 (1986) (by implication); Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 116-17 (1982)
(by implication); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604, 608-09 (1978) (by implication);
Hargrave v. Dugger, 832 F.2d 1528, 1531-33 (11 th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1071
(1989) (citing Hitchcock, 481 U.S. at 393, for proposition that violations of rule of Lockett,
438 U.S. at 604, are per se reversible).
107 If a sentencer in a "weighing" state bases a death sentence on an invalid aggravating factor, the condemned individual has a constitutional right to have either the state
courts or the original sentencer reweigh the valid aggravating and mitigating factors. In
this event, the federal courts may not themselves engage in either a reweighing or in
harmless error analysis. See, e.g., Richmond v. Lewis, 113 S. Ct. 528, 535 (1992)
("Where the death sentence has been infected by a vague or otherwise constitutionally
invalid aggravating factor, the state appellate court . . . or other state sentencer must
actually perform a new sentencing calculus .... ") (emphasis added); Sochor v. Florida,
112 S. Ct. 2114, 2123 (1992); Parker v. Dugger, 498 U.S. 308, 322-23 (1991); Clemons
v. Mississippi, 494 U.S. 738, 754 (1993); Wiley v. Puckett, 969 F.2d 86, 94 n.8 (5th Cir.
1992) (pre-Brecht decision). But see Smith v. Dixon, 14 F.3d 956 (4th Cir. 1994) (en banc)
(overturning panel decision adhering to automatic-relief rule and engaging in harmless
error analysis following conclusion that jury premised original sentence in part on aggravating circumstance).
108 See, e.g., Sochor, 112 S. Ct. at 2123.
109 See, e.g., Lozada v. Deeds, 498 U.S. 430, 432 (1991) (per curiam) (petitioner was
entitled to certificate of probable cause on claim of ineffectiveness of counsel on appeal
even without showing of prejudice because "at least two Courts of Appeals have presumed prejudice" when petitioner is deprived of right to appeal); Lozada v. Deeds, 964
F.2d 956, 958 (9th Cir. 1992) (following reversal and remand by Supreme Court, circuit
court "hold[s] that prejudice is presumed under Strickland [v. Washington] if it is established that counsel's failure to file a notice of appeal was without the petitioner's consent"); Gray v. United States, 834 F.2d 967 (lth Cir. 1987) (per curiam)
(unconstitutional denial of appeal is reversible per se); Ashby v. Wyrick, 693 F.2d 789,
794 (8th Cir. 1982) (similar).
110 See, e.g., Sullivan v. Louisiana, 113 S. Ct. 2078, 2084 (1993) (Rehnquist, CJ., concurring) (quoting and citing Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 579 n.7, 580 n.8 (1986)) (suggesting that harmless error analysis is not appropriate if an "error restricted the
defendants' 'opportunity to put on evidence and make argument to support [their]
claim[s] of innocence,' ."'affect[ed] the composition of the record,' " or "prevented
the jury from considering certain evidence"); Lozada, 498 U.S. at 432 (discussed supra
note 109); Teel v. Tennessee, 498 U.S. 1007 (1990) (White, J., dissenting from denial of
certiorari);Holbrook v. Flynn, 475 U.S. 560, 568 (1986) (suggesting that unconstitutional
shackling is prejudicial per se). See also Riggins v. Nevada, 112 S. Ct. 1810, 1816-17
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to include a number of other constitutional rights."1 1
IV.

STANDARDS,

CRITERIA, AND PROCEDURES FOR ASSESSING
HARMLESSNESS

A.

INTRODUCTION

Although in Brecht the Supreme Court specified the harmless
error standard that henceforth will apply in habeas corpus proceedings by adopting the rule of Kotteakos v. United States, 1 2 the Court
left much unsaid about the meaning and application of that standard. Already noted is the majority's silence on the question of
which party bears the burden of proving harmlessness or its opposite. ' 13 Also unstated is the degree of certainty by which the court
must be convinced that the error had no, or had some, substantial
effect-be that burden "beyond a reasonable doubt," "by clear and
convincing evidence," by a "preponderance of the evidence" or
some alternative formulation such as a "high," "reasonable," or
simple "probability." Brecht also incompletely addressed the focus
of its "no substantial effect" test: is the question whether the error
had no (or some) substantial impact on the process by which the
actual jury reached a verdict, or is it whether removing the error
creates a substantial likelihood of a different outcome upon a hypothetical new trial? Finally, because Brecht applied its new standard to
only the single violation before it, the Court had only a little to say
about the factors the new standard makes relevant.
(1992). Brecht itself may have recognized a new category of structural error-i.e., error

that is so "egregious" and "deliberate" or so bound up "with a pattern of prosecutorial
misconduct" as to "infect the integrity of the proceedings ....

" Brecht v. Abrahamson,

113 S. Ct. 1710, 1722 n.9 (1993). Because the Court's important but ambiguous dicta in
this regard warrants extended discussion, it is treated in a separate section. See infra
notes 177-90 and accompanying text.
111 See, e.g., Hays v. Arave, 977 F.2d 475, 479 (9th Cir. 1992) ("unconstitutional sen-

tencing of an individual in absentia ... is a 'structural' error and.., cannot be affirmed
on the basis of harmless error"); Woods v. Dugger, 923 F.2d 1454, 1460 (11th Cir.
1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 407 (1991) (presence of large numbers of uniformed cor-

rections officers as spectators at petitioner's trial for killing of prison guard violated
right to a fair trial and "a denial of a fair trial can never be harmless because the right is
so fundamental to our notion of due process"); Sheppard v. Rees, 909 F.2d 1234, 123638 (9th Cir. 1989) ("fundamental right to be clearly informed [in a timely fashion] of the

nature and cause of the charges in order to permit adequate preparation of a defense");
Meagher v. Dugger, 861 F.2d 1242, 1244-47 (11 th Cir. 1988) (foregoing jury trial in

reliance on plea bargain thatjudge did not follow in sentencing); Jones v. Lockhart, 851
F.2d 1115, 1117 (8th Cir. 1988) (erroneous stipulation to prior felony convictions when
enhancement statute was involved). See also Anderson v. Butler, 858 F.2d 16, 19 (1st Cir.

1988) (counsel's failure to call psychiatric experts after promising to do so in opening
statement is prejudicial as matter of law).
112 328 U.S. 750 (1946). See supra notes 10-15 and accompanying text.
113 See supra notes 29-37 and accompanying text.
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These open questions are important. Even assuming a standard focused on the "substantiality" vel non of a violation, wide variations in the meaning of the Brecht/Kotteakos rule remain possible,
pending the resolution of these questions. On the one hand, taking
Brecht at its word that it changed nothing but the "standard" of review under Chapman v. California, 11 4 the rule would require the state
to prove beyond a reasonable doubt'1 5 that the error had no substantial effect on the jury's view of the case when it deliberated to a
verdict against the petitioner (or, put differently, to dispel any reasonable possibility that the error had such an effect). 1 16 On the
other hand, were Brecht meant to transform the harmless error doctrine from a defense applicable only in cases of relatively minor violations into a new and difficult-to-satisfy element of the violation
itself, the decision might require petitioners to show, for example, a
substantial probability of acquittal at a hypothetical new trial at
17
which the violation did not occur.
114 See, e.g., Brecht, 113 S. Ct. at 1713-14 (discussing Chapman v. California, 386 U.S.
18 (1967)); see also supra notes 31-35 and accompanying text (discussing Court's replacement of Chapman with Brecht harmless error standard in habeas corpus proceedings).
115 See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 21 (1967).
116 Although not entirely clear on the point, Brecht seems to intend only a modest
change in the harmless error doctrine in habeas corpus. See Brecht, 113 S. Ct. at 17 13-14
(Kotteakos standard adopted because it is "less onerous" than the Chapman standard); id.

at 1724-25 (Stevens, J. concurring) ("The Kotteakos standard ... is less stringent than the
Chapman ... standard ....
Given the critical importance of the faculty ofjudgment in

administering either standard, however, that difference is less significant than it might
seem .... "); id. at 1723 (Stevens,J. concurring) (although not as demanding on the state
as the Chapman standard, the Kotteakos standard is "appropriately demanding"); id. at
1731 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("Kotteakos .

.

. is somewhat more lenient" than Chap-

man). See also United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499, 509 n.7 (1983) (harmless error
standard in 28 U.S.C. "§ 2111 [and thus Kotteakos, see supra notes 57-68 and accompanying text] by its terms may be coextensive with Chapman") (emphasis added). Cf. Brecht, 113
S. Ct. at 1727 (White, J., dissenting) ("The majority's decision to adopt this novel approach is far from inconsequential.").
117 This standard essentially would supplement the doctrine defining every constitutional violation with a requirement of "materiality" of the sort that is an element of a
"prosecutorial suppression of exculpatory evidence" violation under United States v.
Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682-83 (1985), or a requirement of "prejudice" of the sort that is
an element of an "ineffective assistance of counsel" claim under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984). Cf. Smith v. Dixon, 996 F.2d 667, 692-93 (4th Cir. 1993)
(Wilkins, J., dissenting), rev'd, 14 F.3d 956 (4th Cir. 1994) (en banc) (Brecht calls for
"precisely the analysis" required by Strickland and is "essentially the same" inquiry as
that required by the prejudice prong of the "cause and prejudice" test in Wainwright v.
Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977)). See generally Liebman & Hertz, supra, note *, § 24.3c (1993
Cum. Supp.) (discussing "prejudice" prong of "cause and prejudice" exception to procedural default rule). This reading of Brecht is not tenable. First, the Brecht Court acknowledged that the petitioner there had established a constitutional violation. See
Brecht, 113 S. Ct. at 1717. The violation finding left only the question whether the " 'effect or influence' " of that violation was insufficient to warrant relief. Id. at 1718 (quoting Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 776 (1946)). The Kotteakos decision, which
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Questions of this sort about other "harmless error" and "prejudice" tests have generated legions of books and articles.", The folthe Brecht Court made authoritative in future habeas corpus cases, see, e.g., Brecht, 113 S.
Ct. at 1722, supra notes 10-15 and accompanying text, likewise treated the harmless error question as one that arises only after a violation has been proved. See Kotteakos v.
United States, 328 U.S. 750, 764-65 (1946).
In addition, Brecht and Kotteakos are replete with acknowledgments that what was at
stake in both cases was the proper scope of "harmless error" analysis. See, e.g., Brecht, 113
S. Ct. at 1713-14, 1716, 1722; Kotteakos, 328 U.S. at 757. As the Court made clear in a
decision announced not long before Brecht, the phrase "harmless error" is a term of art
that applies only after a violation has been found. That distinguishes other prejudicefocused doctrines, which, by contrast, determine whether or not a violation has occurred
in the first place:
[Today's decision does not involve or require a harmless error inquiry. Harmless
error analysis is triggered only after the reviewing court discovers that an error has
been committed. And under Strickland v. Washington, an error of constitutional magnitude occurs in the Sixth Amendment context only if the defendant demonstrates
(1) deficient performance and (2) prejudice. Our opinion does nothing more than
apply the case-by-case prejudice inquiry that has always been built into the Strickland
test. Since we find no constitutional error, we need not, and do not, consider
harmlessness.
Lockhart v. Fretwell, 113 S. Ct. 838, 842-43 n.2 (1993) (emphasis in original) (citation
omitted). In short, Brecht is a harmless error, not a constitutional merits, decision. It
simply cannot be read to add a new "prejudice" element to the definition of every variety of constitutional trial error that petitioners might allege in support of habeas corpus
relief.
A different approach to the issue leads to the same conclusion. Even if the burden
of proof of "substantial effect" rested on the petitioner, the burden thereby imposed
would, at most, be one that is coextensive with a federal criminal appellant's burden of
showing "plain error" under FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(b). United States v. Olano, 113 S. Ct.
1770, 1777-78 (1993) explains that the "substantial effect" test in the "harmless error"
provision of FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(a)-which, as developed above, is identical to Kotteakos'
"substantial effect" test adopted in Brecht, see supra notes 51-55 and accompanying textis the same as the "substantial effect" test in the "plain error" provision of Criminal
Rule 52(b), with the only difference between the two subparts of Rule 52 being Rule
52(a)'s allocation to the government of the burden of proving harmlessness, and Rule
52(b)'s allocation to the appellant of the burden of proving plain error. Moreover, the
Court has carefully noted that the appellant's burden of showing "plain error" under
Rule 52(b) is a lesser burden than is the burden borne by a prisoner attempting to show
"cause and prejudice" under Wainwright v. Sykes, 473 U.S. 72 (1977), and afortiori,than
the burden borne by a defendant attempting to establish the "materiality" element of a
"suppression of evidence" violation under Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682-83, or the "prejudice"
element of an "ineffective assistance" violation under Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. See
Frady v. United States, 456 U.S. 152, 166 n.15 (1982) (burden of demonstrating Sykes
"prejudice" is greater than burden of demonstrating Rule 52(b) "plain error"); Henderson v. Kibbe, 431 U.S. 145, 154 (1977) (same); LIEBMAN & HERTZ, supra note *, § 24.3c
(1993 Cum. Supp.) (standard of Sykes prejudice is certainly no more, and probably is
less, demanding than burden of showing Bagley "materiality" or Strickland "prejudice").
Likewise, an analysis of Brecht and Kotteakos makes clear that the Brecht/Kotteakos rule is
not focused on the outcome of a hypothetical trial at which the violation did not occur,
but rather on the violation's effect or lack of it on the actual trial at which the petitioner
was convicted. See infra notes 132-50 and accompanying text. (We are particularly indebted to John Blume for the analysis set out in this paragraph.)
118 See, e.g., LAFAvE & ISRAEL, supra note 1, § 26.6; WEINsnIN & BERGER, supra note 1,
§ 2.03(05); TRAYNOR, supra note 1; Field, supra note 1; Goldberg, supra note 1;
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lowing discussion does not offer a comprehensive treatment of these
issues. Instead, it examines the bearing on them of Brecht and the
small number of other sources (primarily Kotteakos) that Brecht treats
as authoritative. Subsection B fleshes out the Kotteakos standard of
harmlessness that the Brecht Court adopted. Subsection C addresses
the degree of certainty by which the decisionmaker must be convinced. Subsection D analyzes whether the proper focus of the
Brecht/Kotteakos test is on the actual effect of the violation on the
petitioner's original trial or on the putative effect of removing the
violation on the outcome of a hypothetical new trial. Subsection E
lists some of the factors that frequently bear on the harmless error
analysis. Finally, subsection F discusses ways in which judges may
go about informing their judgment on the harmless error question.
B.

THE STANDARD OF REVIEW

As noted, the Brecht Court adopted as the standard of harmlessness of constitutional error in habeas corpus proceedings the harmlessness standard that the Court has applied to nonconstitutional
error since its 1946 decision in Kotteakos. 119 In describing the Kotteakos standard, the Brecht Court repeatedly quotes a passage from
Kotteakos that asks "whether the ... error 'had substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict.' -120 Justice
Rutledge's explication of the standard in Kotteakos, however, is far
richer than a single quotation reveals.
Of particular note, Justice Rutledge concluded his most selfconscious statement of the standard in Kotteakos in the following
manner:
If, when all is said and done, the conviction is sure that the error
did not influence the jury, or had but very slight effect, the verdict and
the judgment should stand ....But if one cannot say, with fair assurance, after pondering all that happened without stripping the erroneous action from the whole, that the judgment was not substantially
swayed by the error, it is impossible to conclude that substantial rights
12 1
were not affected.
In addition to speaking directly to Kotteakos' allocation of the burden
of proving harmlessness 12 2 and the decision's careful calibration of
Monaghan, supra, note 1; Saltzburg, supra note 1; Stacy & Dayton, supra note I; Harmless
Error, ProsecutorialMisconduct, supra note I; Harmful Use of Harmless Errorin CriminalCases,

supra note 1; Deadly Mistakes: Harmless Errorin Capital Sentencing, supra note 1.
119 See Brecht, 113 S. Ct. at 1722; supra notes 11-15 and accompanying text.
120 Brecht, 113 S.Ct. at 1714 (quoting Kotteakos, 328 U.S. at 776); see also id. at 1718 &
n.7, 1722.
121 Kotteakos, 328 U.S. at 764-65.

122 See supra notes 38-41 and accompanying text.
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the degree of certainty that the decisionmaker must have before
finding an error harmless, 23 this crucial passage makes clear that
harmless error determinations should hinge on the difference between an error with only "slight effect" on the jury, for which relief
need not be granted, and an error that "substantially swayed" the
jury, which requires relief.
C.

THE REQUISITE DEGREE OF CERTAINTY

Perhaps no question presented by harmless error theory is
more vexing than that of the degree of conviction or certainty that a
decisionmaker must have in regard to the error's effect on the proceedings before deeming the error reversible or not. That is, must
the judge be sure (or alternatively, "pretty sure," "reasonably sure,"
"more sure than not") that the error did not have a substantial effect on the jury's deliberations in the case? 12 4 The lower courts'
myriad formulations of the degree of conviction they require before
finding nonconstitutional error harmless illustrate the difficulties
1 25
the question has posed.
Nonetheless, given Brecht's clear adoption of the harmless error
rule of Kotteakos, t 26 and given Kotteakos' clear pronouncements on
the "degree of certainty" issue, that issue may be less difficult in this
context than in others. According to Kotteakos, reversal is required
123 See infra note 127 and accompanying text.
124 Under the Chapman standard that Brecht supplanted in habeas corpus cases, the
requisite degree of certainty was clear: the state had to demonstrate that the error "was
harmless beyond a reasonabledoubt." Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967) (emphasis added). See also supra notes 3-9 and accompanying text.
125 For example, the D.C. Circuit has sometimes required reversal unless the government convinced it beyond a reasonable doubt that the error had no substantial effect.
See United States v. Fowler, 608 F.2d 2, 12 (D.C. Cir. 1979); see also Dallago v. United
States, 427 F.2d 546, 560 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (reversal required if there is the "slightest
possibility" that the error affected the verdict). At other times, however, without acknowledging any inconsistency, the same circuit has allowed the government to avoid
reversal by showing that it is "more probable than not" that the error had no substantial
effect on the verdict. See United States v. Norris, 873 F.2d 1519, 1525 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 493 U.S. 835 (1989). Likewise, the Third Circuit has applied tests ranging from a
requirement of reversal if there is any "reasonable possibility" that the error had a substantial effect on the verdict (in essence, a "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard), Government of Virgin Islands v. Bedford, 671 F.2d 758, 763 n.7 (3d Cir. 1982), to a
requirement of reversal unless the government demonstrates a "high[] probab[ility]"
that the error had no substantial effect (something like a "clear and convincing" standard), Government of Virgin Islands v. Toto, 529 F.2d 278, 283-84 (3d Cir. 1976), to a
standard forbidding reversal unless the petitioner proves a "reasonable probability" of
substantial harm, United States v. Hill, 976 F.2d 132, 143 (3d Cir. 1992). See also United
States v. Hitt, 981 F.2d 422, 425 (9th Cir. 1992) (noting conflict in Ninth Circuit precedent on degree of conviction required to find error harmless).
126 See supra notes 11-15 and accompanying text.
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upon a finding of error unless "the conviction is sure that the error did
not influence the jury" or "if one cannot say, with fair assurance...
that the judgment was not substantially swayed by the error."1 27 To
like effect is another statement in Kotteakos, which the Court thereafter repeated in United States v. Lane' 28 in a passage to which Brecht
specifically refers in describing its new harmless error standard for
habeas corpus cases: "'The inquiry ... is ... whether the error
itself had substantial influence. If so, or ifone is left in grave doubt, the
conviction cannot stand.' "129 Defined in terms of either the degree
of certainty that the judge must possess before finding an error
harmless or the degree of doubt on the judge's part that prevents
such a finding, the Kotteakos test seems to fall in essentially the
"highly probable" or "clear and convincing" range: An error is
harmless if the court has a fair assurance or sure conviction that the
error did not substantially affect the verdict; the error is not harmless if there is a grave doubt (i.e., something more than merely a
reasonable possibility or reasonable doubt' 3 0 ) as to the substantial13
ity of the error's impact. '
127 Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 765 (1946) (emphasis added).
128 474 U.S. 438 (1986).
129 Id. at 449 (quoting Kotteakos, 328 U.S. at 765, and quoted in Brecht v. Abraham-

son, 113 S. Ct. 1710, 1722 (1993)) (emphasis added).
130 Cf Brecht v. Abrahamson, 113 S. Ct. 1710, 1721 (1993) (quoting and distinguishing Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967) (quoting Fahy v. Connecticut, 375
U.S. 85, 86 (1966) ("granting relief merely because there is a 'reasonable possibility'
that the trial error contributed to the verdict is at odds with the historic meaning of
habeas corpus"))).
131 This statement of the test conjoins Kotteakos' description of the burden of proof
(referred to above as the requisite degree of certainty) with Kotteakos' allocation of the
burden to the state. See supra notes 22-71 and accompanying text.
Cases which have used a reasonable facsimile of the "fair assurance"/"grave doubt"
test include: United States v. Hitt, 981 F.2d 422, 425 (9th Cir. 1992) (requiring "fair
assurance" that violation was harmless, because "fair assurance" standard "seems to
have the Supreme Court's blessing" in Kotteakos); United States v. Tyler, 943 F.2d 420,
423 (4th Cir.) ("grave doubt" as to error's substantiality requires reversal), cert. denied,
112 S.Ct. 646 (1991); United States v. Wood, 924 F.2d 399, 402 (1st Cir. 1991) ("fair
assurance" defined as "highly probable"); United States v. Colombo, 909 F.2d 711, 713
(2d Cir. 1990) (" 'conviction is sure' "); United States v. Sands, 899 F.2d 912, 916 (10th
Cir. 1990) ("fair assurance" defined as "reasonable certainty"); United States v. Moree,
897 F.2d 1329, 1332-33 (5th Cir. 1990) ("significant possibility" of substantial effect
requires reversal); Schrand v. Federal Pacific Elec. Co., 851 F.2d 152, 157 (6th Cir.
1988) ("fair assurance"); United States v. Bernal, 814 F.2d 175, 185 (5th Cir. 1987)
("fair assurance"); United States v. Muza, 788 F.2d 1309, 1312 (8th Cir. 1986) ("fair
assurance"); United States v. Nyman, 649 F.2d 208, 212 (4th Cir. 1980) ("fair assurance" defined as "highly probable"); Government of Virgin Islands v. Toto, 529 F.2d
278, 283-84 (3d Cir. 1976) ("fair assurance" defined as "highly probable"). See also Tipton v. Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce, 872 F.2d 1491, 1498 (11th Cir. 1989)
("likely"); United States v. Hays, 872 F.2d 582, 588 (5th Cir. 1989) (error requires reversal unless court can "conclude that the error had no effect, or only a slight effect on
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THE FOCUS OF INQUIRY-ACTUAL IMPACT VERSUS HYPOTHETICAL
OUTCOME

Characterizing an error as harmless might have either of two
meanings. On the one hand, an error might be deemed harmless if
it played such an inconsequential role in the actual trial in which it
occurred that it assuredly had no impact on the trial's verdict. On
the other hand, an error might be deemed harmless-even if it
played an important role in the actual trial-if a hypothetical new
trial absent the error would likely produce the same outcome as did
132
the actual trial.
In some cases, this difference in approach to harmless error will
have little impact. For example, in a case in which the error produced the only evidence of guilt (say, a coerced confession), the
error assuredly will have affected the evidence, argument, instructions, deliberations, and, accordingly, the guilty verdict at the actual
trial. By like measure, curing the error assuredly would result in a
not-guilty verdict at a hypothetical new trial. In both cases, the analysis is essentially the same, and the conclusion is identical: the error
quite obviously was not harmless. Similarly, if an error occurred so
far on the periphery of the original proceedings (say, a brief, casual
remark by a police witness about a defendant's post-arrest silence1 3 3 ) that the lawyers, judge, and, assumedly, the jurors paid it
no heed, then a hypothetical new proceeding absent the error would
assumedly resemble the actual proceeding at which the error was
essentially invisible, and the harmless error analyses and conclusions in both events will be similar. 134
the jury's decision"); United States v. Shackleford, 738 F.2d 776, 783 (7th Cir. 1984)
(reversal required because "we cannot say that the [error] did not reasonably have a
substantial influence of [sic] the minds of the jurors"); United States v. Davis, 657 F.2d
637, 640 (4th Cir. 1981) ("probable"). A few decisions apply something closer to a
"more probable than not" standard. See United States v. Lui, 941 F.2d 844, 848 (9th
Cir. 1991); United States v. Norris, 873 F.2d 1519, 1525 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S.
835 (1989); United States v. Weger, 709 F.2d 1151, 1158 (7th Cir. 1983).
132 There arguably is a third approach to harmless error, which in fact is a variation of
the first approach. This approach would analyze a single aspect of an error's impact on
the actual proceedings-namely, the extent to which the error "render[ed] the result of
the trial unreliable or [rendered] the proceeding fundamentally unfair." Lockhart v.
Fretwell, 113 S.Ct. 838, 844 (1993) (finding counsel's error, which had major impact on
both the proceedings and outcome of the original trial (and the removal of which, at a
later trial, might well have changed the outcome), to be nonprejudicial for purposes of
assessing the prejudice prong of the test for ineffective assistance of counsel, because
the error had no impact on the fairness of either the proceeding or its result).
133 See Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976).
134 For the reasons discussed in the text, the strength or weakness of the evidence of
guilt that was properly admitted at the actual trial is relevant under both approaches to
harmless error. Nonetheless, the two approaches diverge in their use of this factor. In
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In the usual case, however, the two approaches require different analyses that are quite capable of reaching different results.
Consider a trial at which the prosecution offers a coerced confession
that monopolizes the lawyers' questions during the voir dire of prospectivejurors as well as their opening and closing arguments, is the
focus of the state's case-in-chief and the defendant's rebuttal, and is
addressed by the judge in her instructions to the jury. In such a
case, the harmless error analysis and conclusion are clear under a
rule focused on the impact of the error on the actual trial: the error
substantially affected the proceedings and was not harmless. This
conclusion holds even if the prosecution's presentation also included reference to strong circumstantial evidence-say, motive,
fingerprints, and a matching license plate number. However else
the prosecution might have chosen to present its case under different, hypothetical circumstances, the prosecution in fact chose to concentrate its attention-thus, in fact forcing defense counsel, the
judge, and assumedly thejurors to focus their attention-on the illegal confession. In the context of the actual trial, the confession was
not harmless.
Under a different harmless error rule, however, one focused on
the outcome of a hypothetical trial conducted without the error, the
analysis would be quite different, as, very possibly, would be the
outcome of the analysis. Here, analysis would focus on a differently
configured, hypothetical trial, at which, in the assumed absence of
the confession, the state's case necessarily would emphasize the circumstantial evidence-motive, fingerprints, and matching license
plate numbers. If that evidence is thought to be likely to lead to a
guilty verdict at the hypothetical trial, then the conclusion of a hypothetical-outcome analysis would be different from the one reached
under an actual-effect analysis-namely, that the error was
3 5
harmless.1
hypothetical-outcome analysis, the emphasis is on the intrinsic or potential strength of
the proper evidence, regardless of the importance, emphasis, or impact of that evidence
at the original trial. In actual-effect analysis, see, e.g., Yates v. Evatt, 111 S. Ct. 1884,
1893-94 (1991); Schneble v. Florida, 405 U.S. 427, 430 (1972), the emphasis instead is
on the strength or weakness of the evidence in the context of the actual trial, and depends less on intrinsic weight and more on the way in which--or the frequency with
which-the evidence actually was introduced, discussed in argument, and instructed on
by the judge. See infra note 158 and accompanying text.
135 Professor Field has described the difference between the two modes of harmless
error analysis as follows:
The first approach requires examining the erroneously admitted evidence, without
regard to the weight of other evidence, to determine whether the error might have
swayed the factfinder and contributed to the verdict. The second position does not
look to the tainted evidence, but to the untainted evidence, and asks whether it
alone compels a verdict.
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As the Court recently held in an opinion by Justice Scalia, the
Constitution seems to dictate the proper choice among these two
modes of harmless error analysis. 13 6 Because the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of a jury trial allocates to actualjurors the exclusive
responsibility to render criminal verdicts, those same actual jurors
must be the focus of harmless error analysis.137 If those jurors deliberated to a verdict without being influenced by an error, then
their verdict satisfies the Constitution's jury-verdict requirement
and may stand. On the other hand, if those jurors deliberated to a
verdict under the influence of a constitutional error, then their verdict is tainted, and a new verdict, produced by a new set of actual
jurors who are not influenced by the error, must supplant the first
verdict.' 3 8 A different approach, which proceeds by imagining the
behavior of hypothetical jurors at a hypothetical new trial, risks depriving the petitioner of ajury trial altogether 3 9 or, at best, of putField, supra note 1, at 16-17. See also Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250, 255 (1969)
(Brennan, J., dissenting). Compare Yates, I11 S.Ct. at 1893-94 (harmless error doctrine
focuses on error's impact on actual trial) and Satterwhite v. Texas, 486 U.S. 249, 258-59
(1988) ("The question ...is not whether the legally admitted evidence was sufficient to
support the death sentence, which we assume it was, but rather whether the State proved
'... that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.' ") and
Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 23 (1967) (actual-impact approach) and Lowery v.
Collins, 988 F.2d 1364, 1373 (5th Cir. 1993) (actual-impact approach) with Arizona v.
Fulminante, I11 S.Ct. 1246, 1265 (1991) (hypothetical-outcome approach: "When reviewing the erroneous admission of an involuntary confession, the appellate court, as it
does with the admission of other forms of improperly admitted evidence, simply reviews
the remainder of the evidence against the defendant to determine whether the admission of the confession was harmless ....
")and Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 579 (1986)
(hypothetical-outcome approach: "Where a reviewing court can find that the record
developed at trial establishes guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, the interest in fairness
has been satisfied and the judgment should be affirmed" even if the prosecution relied,
or the trial judge instructed, on an unconstitutional burden-shifting presumption).
136 See Sullivan v. Louisiana, 113 S.Ct. 2078, 2080-83 (1993).
137 See id. at 2080 (proper approach to harmless error analysis is dictated by the Sixth
Amendment "right to have the jury, rather than the judge, reach the requisite finding of
'guilty' ").
138 As Justice Scalia noted in Sullivan, in considering the harmlessness vel non of an
improper instruction on reasonable doubt, the constitutional right to ajury verdict comprehends the constitutional right to a jury verdict free of the influence of violations of
other constitutional rights. See id. at 2081. Thus, in view of the Fifth Amendment due
process clause's requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, "the jury verdict required by the Sixth Amendment is a jury verdict of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt."
Id. Accordingly, ajury verdict reached at a level of certainty less than beyond a reasonable doubt is not a valid verdict under the Sixth, as well as the Fifth, Amendments and
must be replaced by a verdict that is valid under both amendments. See id.
139 See id. at 2082 (citing Yates, 111 S.Ct. at 1898 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment) for the proposition that it is " 'not enough'" to" 'conclude
that ajury would surely havefound petitioner guilty beyond a reasonable doubt' "; instead,
court must conclude that "the jury's actual finding of guilty beyond a reasonable doubt
would surely not have been different, absent the constitutional error").
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ting the reviewing judges in the role of jurors, in violation of the
Sixth Amendment requirement of a jury of one's peers drawn from
one's community. 140 As the Court concluded:
Consistent with the jury-trial guarantee, the question... the reviewing
court [is] to consider is not what effect the constitutional error might
generally be expected to have upon a reasonable jury, but rather what
effect it had upon the guilty verdict in the case at hand. Harmlesserror review looks, we have said, to the basis on which "the jury actually rested its verdict." The inquiry, in other words, is not whether, in a
trial that occurred without the error, a guilty verdict would surely have
been rendered, but whether the guilty verdict actually rendered in this
trial was surely unattributable to the error. That must be so, because
to hypothesize a guilty verdict that was never in fact rendered-no
matter how inescapable the findings to support
that verdict might be41
would violate the jury-trial guarantee.'
Here again, however, the answer to the question of which focus
of analysis is correct in the current habeas corpus context is simpler
than a comprehensive review of the general harmless error caselaw
and secondary writing would suggest. Brecht controls that context,
140 See id. (it is improper for "reviewing court" to "engage in pure speculation-its
view of what a reasonable jury would have done"; "when it does that, 'the wrong entity
judge[s] the defendant guilty' ") (quoting Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 578 (1986));
United States v. Lane, 474 U.S. 438, 465 (1986) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) ("[h]armless-error analysis is not an excuse for overlooking error
because the reviewing court is itself convinced of the defendant's guilt"; because the
guilt determination "is for the jury to make .... the reviewing court is concerned solely
with whether the error may have had a 'substantial effect' upon that body") (emphasis
added); Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 763 (1946) ("lilt is not the appellate
court's function to determine guilt or innocence ....
Nor is it to speculate upon probable reconviction and decide according to how the speculation comes out.").
141 Sullivan, 113 S. Ct. at 2081-82 (citations omitted) (quoting Yates v. Evatt, 111 S.
Ct. 1884, 1893 (1991) (emphasis added by the Court) and citing Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S.
570, 578 (1986)); Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 497, 509-10 (1987) (Stevens, J., dissenting);
Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967)). See also Yates v. Evatt, 111 S. Ct. 1884,
1893 (1991) (reviewing court must focus on the evidence "the jury actually considered
in reaching its verdict"); Satterwhite v. Texas, 486 U.S. 249, 258-59 (1988) (the question
"is not whether the legally admitted evidence was sufficient to support the death sentence, which we assume it was, but rather, whether the State has proven 'beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict

obtained' ").

Although Sullivan involved an application of the Chapman standard of "harmlessness
beyond a reasonable doubt," the Court directed its analysis to all "harmless error" analysis. Sullivan, 113 S. Ct. at 2081-82. In any event, in another case announced nearly
contemporaneously with both Brecht and Sullivan, the Court endorsed the same approach in applying the "substantial impact" standard that Brecht adopted. See United
States v. Olano, 113 S. Ct. 1770, 1780 (1993) (describing "the normal interpretation of
the phrase 'affecting substantial rights,' "and the "ultimate inquiry" in assessing "prejudicial impact" for purposes of harmless error analysis under a "substantial effect" regime, as the following question: "Did the intrusion affect the jury's deliberations and
thereby its verdict?").
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and the standard to which the Brecht Court repeatedly referred,
drawn from Kotteakos v. United States, 14 2 answers the question: "the
standard for determining whether habeas relief must be granted is
whether ... the error 'had a substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict.' "143
The determinative consideration under the Brecht/Kotteakos
standard thus is not the strength of the evidence or the probability
of conviction at a hypothetical retrial absent the error.1 44 Rather,
the relevant question is whether the error substantially affected the
actual thinking of the jurors or the deliberative processes by which
they reached their verdict. Once again the words of Justice Rutledge in Kotteakos are instructive:
[T]he question is ... not [whether the jurors] were... right in their

judgment, regardless of the error or its effect upon the verdict. It is
rather what effect the error had or reasonably may be taken to have
had upon the jury's decision. The crucial thing is the impact of the
thing done wrong on the minds of other men, not on one's own, in the
total setting.
This must take account of what the error meant to them, not singled out and standing alone, but in relation to all else that happened.
And one must judge others' reactions not by his own, but with allowance for how others might react and not be regarded generally as acting without reason. This is the important difference, but one easy to
ignore when the sense of guilt comes strongly from the record. 145
328 U.S. at 750.
Brecht v. Abrahamson, 113 S. Ct. 1710, 1713-14 (1993) (quoting Kotteakos, 328
U.S. at 776 (emphasis added)); accord id. at 1718, 1718 n.7, 1722; id. at 1724 (StevensJ.,
concurring). See also id. at 1717 ("Trial error... is amenable to harmless-error analysis
because it 'may ... be quantitatively assessed in the context of other evidence presented
in order to determine [the effect it had on the trial].' ") (quoting Arizona v. Fulminante, 111
S. Ct. 1246, 1264 (1991) (brackets in original) (emphasis added)); id. at 1723 (Stevens,
J., concurring) (the Court's new harmless error standard "requires a habeas court to
review the entire record de novo in determining whether the error influenced thejury's deliberations") (emphasis added); id. at 1724 ("The purpose of [the requirement that the
court] review the entire record is, of course, to consider all the ways that error can infect
the course of a trial.") (emphasis added); id. (quoting Kotteakos, 328 U.S. at 764-65, for the
proposition that "[t]he habeas court cannot ask only whether it thinks the petitioner
would have been convicted even if the constitutional error had not taken place" and
must decide that 'the error did not influence the jury,' and that 'the judgment was not substantially swayed by the error.' ") (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
144 Id. at 1724 (Stevens,J., concurring) ("The habeas court cannot ask only whether it
thinks the petitioner would have been convicted even if the constitutional error had not
taken place. Kotteakos is full of warnings to avoid that result.").
145 Kotteakos, 328 U.S. at 764 (citations omitted). See Brecht, 113 S. Ct. at 1724 (Stevens, J., concurring) (passage quoted in text is one "that should be kept in mind by all
courts that review trial transcripts"); United States v. Lane, 474 U.S. 438, 449 (1986)
(quoting Kotteakos, 328 U.S. at 765: "'The inquiry cannot be merely whether there was
enough [evidence] to support the result, apart from the phase affected'by the error. It is
rather ... whether the error itself had substantial influence."). Kotteakos could not be
142
143

1146

LIEBMAN & HERTZ

[Vol. 84

The best way to illustrate this approach to harmless error review is to consider the application of the approach in the case in
which it was established, Kotteakos, and the case in which the Court
applied it to habeas corpus proceedings, Brecht. In Kotteakos, the
Court reversed a lower court conclusion that an instructional error
was harmless" 'since guilt was so manifest.' ",146 Although agreeing
with the lower court that guilt was manifest, the Court nonetheless
found the instructional error prejudicial because the error "pervaded the entire charge" and accordingly made it "highly probable
that the error had substantial and injurious effect or influence in
determining the jury's verdict." 1 47 In reaching this result, the Kotteakos Court took great pains to make clear to lower court judges
that the touchstone of harmless error is not whether "there was
enough [evidence] to support the result, apart from the phase affected by the error"; or whether "the evidence offered specifically
and properly to convict each defendant would be sufficient to sustain his conviction, if submitted in a separate trial"; or whether the
clearer on this point, given its repeated descriptions of the actual-effect focus of harmless error analysis. See Kotteakos, 328 U.S. at 762 (analysis focuses on "the relation of the
error asserted to casting the balance for decision on the case as a whole"); id. at 764 (the
"effect the error had or reasonably may be taken to have had upon the jury's decision");
id. ("the impact of the thing done wrong on the minds of [the jurors]"); id. (whether the
error "influence[d] the jury"); id. at 765 (whether "the judgment was ... substantially
swayed by the error"); id. ("whether the error itself had substantial influence"); id. at
776 (whether "the error had substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining
the jury's verdict").
Although the small number of lower court decisions published since Brecht have not
been particularly explicit or careful in revealing the focus of their analyses, most seem to
concentrate on the error's impact on the actual trial, not the strength of the evidence as
it bears exclusively on the likelihood of conviction on retrial. See, e.g., Jeffries v. Blodgett, 5 F.3d 1180, 1190-91 (9th Cir. 1993); Tague v. Richards, 3 F.3d 1133, 1140 (7th Cir.
1993); Lowery v. Collins, 996 F.2d 770, 772-73 (5th Cir. 1993); Duest v. Singletary, 997
F.2d 1336 (11 th Cir. 1993); Stoner v. Sowders, 997 F.2d 209 (6th Cir. 1993); Vanderbilt
v. Collins, 994 F.2d 189 (5th Cir. 1993); Standen v. Whitley, 994 F.2d 1417 (9th Cir.
1993); McKinney v. Rees, 993 F.2d 1378 (9th Cir.) cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 622 (1993);
Pemberton v. Collins, 991 F.2d 1218, 1226-27 (5th Cir.) cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 637
(1993); Cumbie v. Singletary, 991 F.2d 715, 755 (11th Cir.) cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 650
(1993). Other decisions emphasize the existence of "overwhelming evidence" without
making clear whether that evidence is relevant because of its tendency, in the context of
the actual trial, to overwhelm the error's effect on the jury or because of the likely outcome that evidence would produce at a new trial. See Quinn v. Neal, 998 F.2d 526 (7th
Cir. 1993); Nethery v. Collins, 993 F.2d 1154 (5th Cir. 1993). Cf supra note 134; infra
notes 158-59 and accompanying text (strength of the evidence relevant, albeit in different ways, under both actual-impact and hypothetical-outcome approaches). At least one
decision uses a standard expressly rejected by Kotteakos. Compare Wright v. Dallman, 999
F.2d 174 (6th Cir. 1993) (error harmless because proper evidence is "sufficient to sustain the jury's guilty verdict") with Kotteakos, 328 U.S. at 763-65, 767, 775-76 (rejecting
"sufficiency of the evidence test").
146 Kotteakos, 328 U.S. at 755.
147 Id. at 768, 776.
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jurors "were ...right in their judgment"; or whether "conviction
would, or might probably, have resulted in a properly conducted
trial"; or even whether "the evidence concerning each petitioner
was so clear that conviction would have been dictated and reversal
forbidden, if it had been presented in [proper] trials." 14 8 Under
Kotteakos, "the question is ... rather what effect the error had or
reasonably may be taken to have had upon the jury's decision. The
crucial thing is the impact of the thing done wrong on the minds of
[the jurors] .... 149
In Brecht, the Court similarly refrained from inquiring whether
the evidence untainted by the constitutional violation was sufficient
to sustain the verdict or whether the defendant would probably be
convicted in a retrial free of error. Focusing on the central question
of whether the constitutional violation " 'substantially influence[d]' " the jurors, the Court concluded that the error was harmless because the prosecutor's unconstitutional references to
petitioner's post-Miranda silence were not only minimal but "in effect, cumulative" of entirely constitutional evidence, given the
state's "extensive and permissible references to petitioner's pre-Miranda silence." 150
E.

RELEVANT FACTORS

Assessments of harmless error are necessarily context-specific,
leading the Court in Kotteakos to recognize that such judgments may
be "tempered," but may not be "governed," by stare decisis or "what
has been done in similar situations." 1 5 1 Context-sensitive factors
that are relevant to harmless error determinations include:
148 Id. at 763-65, 767, 775-76. Notably, the passage that contains Kotteakos' most sustained admonition to judges to avoid hypothetical-outcome analysis in favor of actualeffect analysis, id. at 775-76, is the same passage from which the Brecht Court extracted
the standard that henceforth is to apply to harmless error analysis in habeas corpus
proceedings, namely, "whether ... the error 'had substantial and injurious effect or
influence in determining the jury's verdict.'" Brecht, 113 S.Ct. at 1713-14 (quoting
Kotteakos, 328 U.S. at 776).
149 Kotteakos, 328 U.S. at 764.
150 Brecht, 113 S. Ct. at 1722.
151 Kotteakos, 328 U.S. at 762 ("In the final analysis judgment in each case must be
influenced by conviction resulting from examination of the proceedings in their entirety,
tempered but not governed in any rigid sense of stare decisis by what has been done in
similar situations."). Emphasizing the context-specificity of harmless error analysis, Kotteakos itself found harmful a type of error that the Court had found harmless in a prior
case, Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78 (1935). See Kotteakos, 328 U.S. at 772:
These are the abstract similarities [between the two cases]. They are only abstract.
To strip them from the separate and distinct total contexts of the two cases, and
disregard the vast difference in those contexts, is to violate the whole spirit, and we
think the letter also, of [the statute governing harmless error analysis].
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(1) The nature of the right at issue and the extent to which violations
of that right are likely to affect the jury's deliberations or other15 2
wise undermine the reliability or fairness of the proceedings.
particular reference to
(2) The "character of the proceedings," 15with
"what is at stake upon its outcome." 3
1 54
(3) The importance of "the phase [of trial] affected by the error."
15 5
(4) The egregiousness of the violation.
(5) The frequency of the error
or the extent to which it "perme15 6
ate[d]" the proceeding.
(6) The "central[ity]" to
the case, as actually tried, of the issue af15 7
fected by the error.
(7) The relative weakness of the properly admitted evidence, to the
extent that this factor bears on the question whether the constitutional error did or did not affect the thinking or deliberative
processes of the actual jurors, 158 or the "closeness of the case"
152 See Kotteakos, 328 U.S. at 761, 766 (likelihood of harm affected by the "nature of
the error," whether, for example, the right violated "embod[ies] a great tradition of
justice or ...a necessity for drawing lines somewhere between great areas of law"); id. at
760-61, 764-65 (recognizing a continuum of predictable harm running from violations
of "technical" errors to violations of "substantial rights" to "departure[s] from a constitutional command or a specific command of Congress"); Fretwell v. Lockhart, 113 S.Ct.
838, 844 (1993) (relevance to harmless error analysis of likelihood that error
"render[ed] the result of the trial unreliable or the proceeding fundamentally unfair").
153 Kotteakos, 328 U.S. at 762 ("Necessarily, the character of the proceeding [and] ...
what is at stake upon its outcome.., are material factors in judgment."). In Kotteakos, the
Court indicated that criminal cases may demand a more stringent standard of harmless
error than civil cases because "a person is on trial for his life or his liberty." Id. at 763.
This factor may have particular significance in capital cases. See LIEBMAN & HERTZ, supra
note *,§ 2.2d; infra notes 191-95 and accompanying text. See also Pemberton v. Collins,
991 F.2d 1218, 1226-27 (5th Cir.) (suggesting that error is less likely harmless when case
is tried to jury than when case is tried to judge), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 637 (1993).
154 Kotteakos, 328 U.S. at 765. See United States v. Lane, 474 U.S. 438, 450 & n.13
(1986) (suggesting that errors occurring during trial court's instructions are more important than ones during lengthy presentation of evidence); Kotteakos, 328 U.S. at 768
(error not harmless, despite strong evidence of guilt, because error "pervaded the entire
[jury] charge"). See also Dobbs v. Zant, 113 S. Ct. 835, 836 n.1 (1993) (per curiam) ("an
inadequate or harmful closing argument, when combined, as here, with a failure to present mitigating evidence, may be highly [prejudicial]").
155 See, e.g., Kotteakos, 328 U.S. at 772-74 (egregiousness of violation before Court distinguishes case from prior cases that found similar errors to be harmless). See also infra
notes 177-90 and accompanying text.
156 Kotteakos, 328 U.S. at 769 (error could not be deemed harmless because it "permeated the entire [jury] charge, indeed the entire trial"). Cf Brecht v. Abrahamson, 113 S.
Ct. 1710, 1722 (1993) (error harmless in part because "[t]he State's references to petitioner's post-Miranda silence were infrequent, comprising less than two pages of the
900-page trial transcript in this case").
157 See, e.g., United States v. Livingston, 661 F.2d 239, 243 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Gaither v.
United States, 413 F.2d 1061, 1079 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
158 See, e.g., Brecht, 113 S.Ct. at 1722 (considering strength of evidence of guilt as one
among several factors relevant in assessing whether error "substantially influence[d]"
jury); Lane, 474 U.S. at 450 (misjoinder-of-claims error unlikely to affect jury because
properly admitted evidence was so strong as to overwhelm the impact of small amount
of evidence admitted exclusively on the misjoined count); Kotteakos, 328 U.S. at 763
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on the evidence adduced at the original trial. 1 59
(8) In cases in which evidence was improperly admitted, the extent
to which:
(a) the prosecutor emphasized the improper evidence in closing
160
argument or the trial judge did so in the jury charge.
(b) the improperly admitted evidence was likely to influence the
jury's deliberations, either because it was particularly salient
or appeared to be particularly probative
of the ultimate is62
sue 16 1 or for some other reason.'
(question "whether the evidence in other respects is evenly balanced or one-sided" is
relevant in determining whether "an error in receiving or excluding evidence" affected
jury). As discussed supra notes 139-41 and 144, the court's assessment of the strength
of the properly admitted evidence must not be based on some notion of the idealized or
intrinsic strength of the evidence or its potential strength if offered at a new trial-at
which its importance will automatically be enhanced by the omission of the improper
evidence introduced at the original trial. Rather, the assessment must focus entirely on
the probability that the properly admitted evidence-as actually presented, argued over,
and instructed on, at the original trial-overwhelmed the effect of improperly admitted
evidence, as that evidence actually was presented, argued over, and instructed on. A
good example of how the strength of the properly admitted evidence should be factored
into an actual-impact approach to harmless error is then-Justice Rehnquist's opinion for
the Court in Schneble v. Florida, 405 U.S. 427 (1972): "In some cases the properly
admitted evidence of guilt is so overwhelming and the prejudicial effect of the [error] is
so insignificant by comparison, that it is clear ...that the [violation] was harmless error." Id. at 430. See also Yates v. Evatt, 111 S. Ct. 1884, 1893-94 (1991); United States v.
Young, 470 U.S. 1, 36 n.4 (1985) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Kotteakos, 328 U.S. at
764).
159 See, e.g., Duest v. Singletary, 997 F.2d 1336, 1338-39 (11th Cir. 1993); United
States v. Urbanik, 801 F.2d 692, 699 (4th Cir. 1986); Gaither, 413 F.2d at 1079.
160 See, e.g., United States v. Ariza-Ibarra, 605 F.2d 1216, 1223 (1st Cir. 1979).
161 See, e.g., Arizona v. Fulminante, 111 S. Ct. 1246, 1257 (1991) (erroneous admission
of coerced confession rarely, if ever, can be deemed "harmless" because "[a] confession
is like no other evidence" and is " 'probably the most probative and damaging evidence
that can be admitted against'" the defendant, and has such a " 'profound impact on the
jury.., that we may justifiably doubt its ability to put [the confession] out of mind even
if told to do so'") (quoting Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 139-40 (1968)
(White, J., dissenting)). See also id. at 1266-67 (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("[T]he court
conducting a harmless-error inquiry must appreciate the indelible impact a full confession may have on the trier of fact .... Apart, perhaps, from a videotape of the crime,
one would have difficulty finding evidence more damaging to a criminal defendant's plea
of innocence."); Carella v. California, 491 U.S. 263, 267, 270 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring) (when assessing harmlessness of erroneous instruction that required jurors conclusively to presume presence of element of the crime, reviewing court should find error to
be harmless only in "'rare situations' "); Lowery v. Collins, 996 F.2d 770, 773 (5th Cir.
1993) (erroneous admission of videotape of interview of child complainant was not
harmless because "the State failed to introduce any non-hearsay, direct evidence of
Lowery's guilt other than the videotaped interview").
162 See, e.g.,Jeffries v. Blodgett, 5 F.3d 1180, 1190-91 (9th Cir. 1993) (jurors' acquisition of extra-record information about defendant's "prior conviction [of crime] similar
to the charge at issue" could not be deemed harmless, given the " 'highly inflammatory'
effect that knowledge of substantially similar bad acts has upon the jury"); Duest, 997
F.2d at 1339 (erroneous admission of subsequently vacated prior conviction deemed not
harmless under Brecht because admitted evidence "was materially inaccurate" and
"helped portray Duest to the jury not only as an individual with a propensity for criminal
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(c) the improperly admitted evidence did not duplicate
other evi63
dence that was lawfully presented to the jury.'
(9) Whether the error resulted in the exclusion or omission of evidence that could have influenced the jury's deliberations or
whether the absence of that evidence could have misled the jury
concerning the facts.1 64
(10) In cases in which there was more than one error, the "cumulative
65
effect" of the errors. 1
(11) Whether the court failed to give "curative instructions" or to take
other remedial measures sufficient to prevent the error
from sub16 6
stantially affecting the jurors' deliberative processes.
F.

THE EXERCISE OF JUDGMENT; DE NOVO REVIEW; HEARINGS

"In the end, the way we phrase the governing standard is far
less important than the quality of the judgment with which it is apviolence, but as a recidivous killer"); Cumbie v. Singletary, 991 F.2d 715, 725 (11 th Cir.
1993) (violation of petitioner's right to face-to-face confrontation was not harmless
under the Brecht/Kotteakos standard because "[e]ven from the cold transcript before us,
[it is apparent that] the [child] victim's testimony is forceful and ... substantially influenced the jury to convict").
163 See, e.g., Brecht v. Abrahamson, 113 S. Ct. 1710, 1722 (1993) (prosecutor's unconstitutional references to petitioner's post-Miranda silence were harmless because they
were "in effect, cumulative" of "State's extensive and permissible references to petitioner's pre-Miranda silence"); United States v. Lane, 474 U.S. 438, 450 (1986) (harmlessness finding based in part on Court's determination that vast majority of evidence
admitted at trial at which counts were improperly joined was admissible despite the misjoinder violation); Lowery, 996 F.2d at 773. See also Milton v. Wainwright, 407 U.S. 371,
372-73 (1972) (introduction of post-indictment confession, even if erroneous, was harmless beyond reasonable doubt under Chapman because jury also heard "no less than
three full confessions that were made by petitioner prior to his indictment" and that
were lawfully introduced); United States v. Parry, 649 F.2d 292, 296 (5th Cir. Unit B
1981).
164 See, e.g., Brecht, 113 S. Ct. at 1730 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (violations of"a defendant's right to confront the witnesses against him," with resulting "absence of full
adversary testing....

cannot help but erode our confidence in a verdict [because] ...

jury easily may be misled by such an omission").
165 See id. at 1722 n.9 (majority opinion); LIEBMAN & HERTZ, supra note

a

*, § 8.4 n.17.1
and accompanying text; infra notes 177-90 and accompanying text.
166 See, e.g., Gaither v. United States, 413 F.2d 1061, 1079 (D.C. Cir. 1969). Compare
Lane, 474 U.S. at 450 (finding error harmless under Kotteakos in part because "District
Court provided a proper limiting instruction" immediately after improper evidence was
introduced and repeated the admonition in the final charge) and id. at 450-51 n. 13 (emphasizing importance of "carefully crafted limiting instructions" and "strict charge")
with id. at 477 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (limiting instruction "surely cannot be regarded
as an adequate response" in light of nature of error). Cf. Bruton v. United States, 391
U.S. 123, 135 (1968) ("[T]here are some contexts in which the risk that the jury will not,
or cannot follow instructions is so great, and the consequences of failure so vital to the
defendant, that the practical and human limitations of the jury system cannot be ignored."); Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 453 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring)
("[T]he naive assumption that prejudicial effects can be overcome by instructions to the
jury ....
all practicing lawyers know to be unmitigated fiction.").
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plied."1 67 Through statements such as this, both Justice Stevens in
concurrence in Brecht and Justice Rutledge for the Court in Kotteakos
emphasized the importance-especially in a "substantial effect"
harmless error regime focused on the context-dependent impact of
constitutional error on other individuals (the jurors)16--of " 'the
discrimination . . . of judgment transcending confinement by
formula or precise rule.' "169
To inform their judgment, district court judges generally are
obliged to consider the entire record. 170 Only in this way can they
understand the way in which the error presented itself to the jurors
and the extent to which the error either was highlighted or overwhelmed by the rest of the trial, including the voir dire of prospective
jurors, presentation of evidence, argument of counsel, instructions,
sentencing proceedings, and other important aspects of the
tribunal. 171
One factor that may not control the judge's determination, and
that can only influence it to the extent the judge independently finds
it persuasive, is a state court determination that the error was harmless. For, "[t]o apply the Kotteakos standard properly, a court must
...

17 2
make a de novo examination of the record."

Brecht, 113 S. Ct. at 1725 (Stevens, J. concurring).
168 See supra notes 132-50 and accompanying text.
169 Brecht, 113 S. Ct. at 1725 (Stevens, J., concurring) (quoting Kotteakos v. United
States, 328 U.S. 750, 761 (1946)). See also id. at 1723 (Stevens, J., concurring) (rule
Court adopts "leaves considerable latitude for the exercise of judgment by federal
courts").
170 See Lane, 474 U.S. at 448; Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 762, 764
(1946) (reviewing court must exercise judgment "influenced by conviction resulting
from examination of the proceedings in their entirety" and must "weigh the error's effect against the entire setting of the record"); Lowery v. Collins, 996 F.2d 770, 773 (5th
Cir. 1993) ("As applied by the Court in Brecht, Kotteakos commands that, in determining
whether a constitutional error is harmless, a de novo review of the entire trial record
must be performed by the reviewing court."). See also Yates v. Evatt, 111 S.Ct. 1884,
1894, 1896 (1991).
171 See Kotteakos, 328 U.S. at 765 (reviewing court should "ponder[ ]all that happened
without stripping the erroneous action from the whole"). As the Court concluded in
Yates, 111 S.Ct. at 1893-94, when making a harmless error determination, the judge
must focus on the evidence the jury actually considered in reaching its verdict and must
decide "whether the force of the evidence presumably considered by the jury in accordance with the instructions is so overwhelming as to leave it beyond a reasonable doubt
that the verdict resting on that evidence would have been the same in the absence of the
[constitutional violation]." In other words, "[t]o say that an error did not contribute to
the verdict is ...to find that error unimportant in relation to everything else the jury
considered on the issue in question, as revealed in the record." Id. at 1893.
172 Brecht, 113 S.Ct. at 1724 (Stevens, J., concurring) ("The Court faithfully engages
in such de novo review today ....just as the plurality did in the dispositive portion of its
analysis in Wright v. West, 112 S.Ct. 2482, 2492-93 (1992) (opinion of Thomas,J.)."). See
also id. at 1731 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (under Kotteakos, the "courts . . .still must
167
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Sometimes, besides independently reviewing the existing record in the case, district court judges may have to make an additional
record of their own. The duty to hold an evidentiary hearing17 3 or
to pursue other fact-development procedures 74 in connection with
harmless error analysis may arise in situations in which the impact of
an error on the proceedings-say, for example, excessive law enforcement presence in the courtroom, outside influences on the jurors, or the racial or other segregation of the courtroom-may not
be fully revealed by the existing record 175 and may properly be inquired into without violating evidentiary rules limiting the testimony
of judges and jurors about their actual thought processes in the
76
course of reaching a decision or verdict.'
conduct their review de novo"); Rushen v. Spain, 464 U.S. 114, 120 (1983) (per curiam)
(cited approvingly in Brecht, 113 S. Ct. at 1721 (majority opinion)) ("The final decision
whether the alleged constitutional error was harmless is one of federal law" subject to
independent federal habeas corpus review (citation omitted)); Duest v. Singletary, 997
F.2d 1336, 1339 & n.4 (11th Cir. 1993) (because "[h]armless error is a mixed question
of law and fact subject to de novo review by this court," "we are not bound by the
Florida Supreme Court's determination on state postconviction review that Duest's ...
claim was harmless"); Orndorff v. Lockhart, 998 F.2d 1426, 1432 (8th Cir. 1993) (relying on prior precedent establishing that harmless error determinations under Chapman
standard are reviewed de novo, Court makes de novo harmless error determination under
Brecht standard); Suniga v. Bunnell, 998 F.2d 664, 667 (9th Cir. 1993). See also Lowery v.
Collins, 988 F.2d 1364, 1372 & n.34 (5th Cir. 1993) (collecting authorities concluding
that harmless error determination under Chapman standard is mixed question of fact and
law subject to de novo review); Dickey v. Lewis, 859 F.2d 1365, 1370 (9th Cir. 1988);J.
LIEBMAN & R. HERTZ, supra note *, § 20.3d n.52 and accompanying text (same).
Although a federal court of appeals likewise should review de novo a federal district
court's harmless error determination on habeas corpus, in the event that the harmless
error question arises for the first time on appeal, the usual practice is to remand the
question to the district court for determination in the first instance. See Dobbs v. Zant,
113 S. Ct. 835, 836 n.1 (1993) (per curiam) (Court remands to lower court to conduct
harmless error analysis pursuant to its "normal practice of allowing courts more familiar
with a case to conduct their own harmless error analyses"); Yates, 111 S. Ct. at 1895;
Lane, 474 U.S. at 450 ("Of course, 'we are not required to review records to evaluate a
harmless-error claim, and do so sparingly .... ' " (quoting United States v. Hasting, 461
U.S. 499, 510 (1983) (footnote omitted))); id. at 454, 464 (Brennan, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part); id. at 476 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
173 SeeJ. LIEBMAN & R. HERTZ, supra note *, ch. 20.

174 See id. §§ 19.3-19.5.
175 See id. § 20.3.
176 See, e.g., Remmer v. United States, 347 U.S. 227, 229-30 (1954) (discussed in
United States v. Olano, 113 S. Ct. 1770, 1781 (1993)) (because sending "an F.B.I. agent
in the midst of a trial to investigate a juror as to his conduct is bound to impress the
juror," Court remands for evidentiary hearing to "determine the circumstances [of the
FBI investigation], the impact thereof upon the juror, and whether or not it was prejudicial"); J. LIEBMAN & R. HERTZ, supra note *, § 21.2 nn.13-14 and accompanying text
(limitations on calling judges and jurors as witnesses in habeas corpus and other federal
proceedings). Cf. Sullivan v. Louisiana, 113 S. Ct. 2078, 2084 (1993) (Rehnquist, C.J.,
concurring) ("reviewing court is usually left only with the record developed at trial to
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THE BRECHT EXCEPTION: EGREGIOUS OR REPEATED
MISCONDUCT

In Brecht, apparently at the behest of Justice Stevens, whose
vote made a majority for the Court's new "substantial effect" harmless error rule for habeas corpus cases, the Court tentatively announced an exception to that rule:
Our holding does not foreclose the possibility that in an unusual case,
a deliberate and especially egregious error of the trial type, or one that
is combined with a pattern of prosecutorial misconduct, might so infect the integrity of the proceeding as to warrant the grant of habeas
1 77
relief, even if it did not "substantially influence" the jury's verdict.
As Justice Stevens explained in his concurrence in Greer v. Miller,
"there may be extraordinary cases in which the... error is so egregious, or is combined with other errors or incidents of prosecutorial
misconduct, that the integrity of the proceeding is called into question." 178 To this prosecution-focused exception may be added the
Brecht Court's suggestion that "affirmative evidence that state-court
judges are ignoring their oath" to uphold federal law might warrant
a less forgiving harmless error rule in order "to deter state courts
from relaxing their own guard in reviewing constitutional error."' 179
As Justice O'Connor pointed out in her dissent in Brecht, the
Court's language in describing this exception is only suggestive,
forcing litigants, lawyers, and courts in the first instance to "address
whether the exception exists at all."' 8 0 In addition, the Court's language leaves open the question of what harmless error standard, if
any, should apply in the event of a qualifying violation that "did not
substantially influence the jury's verdict."' 8 1 If this exception is
simply designed to establish a new category of prejudicial per se or
automatically reversible "structural error" of the sort discussed in
Part III above, then the violation should require reversal apart from
any harmless error inquiry. 8 2 On the other hand, because the
Brecht Court refers in the passage recognizing the exception to "error of the trial type," about which the Court previously stated that
determine whether it is possible to say ... that the error did not contribute to the jury's
verdict").
177 Brecht v. Abrahamson, 113 S. Ct. 1710, 1722 n.9 (1993) (citing Greer v. Miller,
483 U.S. 756, 769 (1987) (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment)).
178 Greer v. Miller, 483 U.S. at 768-69 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment). Cf.
Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 604 (1975) (in assessing taint of Fourth Amendment
violations, "the purpose and flagrancy of... official misconduct are... relevant" (footnote omitted)). See also Note, Harmless Error, ProsecutorialMisconduct, supra note 1.
179 Brecht, 113 S. Ct. at 1721.
180 Id. at 1731 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
181 Id. at 1722 n.9 (majority opinion).
182 See supra notes 80-86 and accompanying text.
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some kind of harmless error analysis always applies, 8 3 the possibility arises that the Court meant to subject these "unusual" or "extraordinary" violations to harmless error analysis under the stricter
184
Chapman v. California standard, which Brecht otherwise supplants.
Whether, as Justice O'Connor wondered, the suggested exception ought to exist at all may depend on two competing sets of concerns. On the one hand, there is a certain logic to the exception the
Court describes. Because the exception focuses on self-conscious
misconduct by prosecutors (and possibly state judges as well), the
exception may restore some of the deterrent capacity lost in the shift
from Chapman to Brecht. That deterrent effect would be brought to
bear in the very cases in which deterrence is most needed and most
likely to prove efficacious. In addition, the putative exception's focus on errors that are obviously flagrant-from either a qualitative
or quantitative perspective-avoids the extra expenditure of resources occasioned by a Brecht inquiry in situations in which an error
is most likely to have been prejudicial.
On the other hand, recognizing the exception would only add
further complexity to an area of the law that Brecht already has made
vastly more complicated by adopting, but only partially explaining, a
special harmless error rule for habeas corpus cases. 185 Moreover,
when combined with the existing categories of violations and proceedings for purposes of harmless error review-(1) per se reversible
violations,' 8 6 (2) per se prejudicial violations,' 8 7 (3) "trial errors" to
which, in certain proceedings, the old Chapman rule applies,18 8 and
(4) "trial errors" to which in other proceedings the Brecht/Kotteakos
rule appliest 89-the recognition of a new set of "trial errors" exempted from category (4) and placed in one of the other categories
(or in a category of its own) would only exacerbate the already dangerous tendency of the Court to view some constitutional rights as
See supra notes 77-79 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 1-9 and accompanying text.
185 See Brecht, 113 S. Ct. at 1731 (O'Connor, J., dissenting):
The interest of efficiency, always relevant to the scope of habeas relief,... favors
simplification of legal inquiries, not their multiplication.

183
184

... [T]he Court's decision buys the federal courts a lot of trouble. From here
on out, prisoners undoubtedly will litigate-and judges will be forced to decidewhether each error somehow might be wedged into the narrow potential exception
the Court mentions in a footnote today.
186 See supra notes 72-111 and accompanying text.
187 See supra notes 72-111 and accompanying text.
188 See supra notes 1-9 and accompanying text. But cf supra note 20 and accompanying
text (discussing the possibility that the Court may be preparing to abandon Chapman in
all cases).
189 See supra notes 10-20 and accompanying text.
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"more equal" than others. 190
VI.

HARMLESS ERROR IN CAPITAL HABEAS CORPUS CASES

Brecht v. Abrahamson was a noncapital case. It did not present,
and the Court consequently did not address, the applicability of its
new rule to capital cases.' 9 1 The current Court generally has resisted special rules for habeas corpus review in capital cases. 192 In
the harmless error context, however, the Court might take a different tack. The choice of harmless error standard is "critical to our
faith in the reliability of the criminal process,"' 9 3 and as the Court
long has recognized, capital cases demand heightened standards of
reliability because of the unique "severity and . . .finality" of the
19 4
death penalty.
Significantly, Justice Stevens, who provided the crucial fifth vote
in Brecht v. Abrahamson, is one of the strongest proponents of specialized, reliability-enhancing procedures in postconviction capital
cases.' 9 5 IfJustice Stevens' capital jurisprudence leads him to favor
application of the more stringent Chapman standard of harmless er190 See Brecht v. Abrahamson, 113 S. Ct. 1710, 1728 (White, J., dissenting):
Our habeas jurisprudence is taking on the appearance of a confused patchwork in
which different constitutional rights are treated according to their status, and in
which the same constitutional right is treated differently depending on whether its
vindication is sought on direct or collateral review. I believe this picture bears scant
resemblance either to Congress' design or to our own precedents.
191 See, e.g., Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 313 (1989) (deciding applicability of
Court's new Teague rule to capital cases, an issue that the Court did not resolve in
Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989) (plurality opinion), because "Teague was not a capital case").
192 See, e.g., Herrera v. Collins, 113 S. Ct. 853, 863 (1993) ("[W]e have 'refused to
hold that the fact that a death sentence has been imposed requires a different standard
of review on federal habeas corpus.'" (quoting Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1, 9
(1989) (plurality opinion))); J. LIEBMAN & R. HERTZ, supra note *, § 2.2d.
193 Brecht, 113 S. Ct. at 1728-29 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
194 Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 637-38 (1980) (quoting Gardner v. Florida, 430
U.S. 349, 357-58 (1977)). See also Herrera, 113 S. Ct. at 863 ("We have, of course, held
that the Eighth Amendment requires increased reliability of the process by which capital
punishment may be imposed."); authority cited inJ. LIEBMAN & R. HERTZ, supra note *,

§ 2.2d.
195 See Penry, 492 U.S. at 349 (Stevens,J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("I
do not support the Court's assertion ... that Teague's retroactivity principles pertain to
capital cases."); Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1, 22 (1989) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(arguing that the "unique nature of the death penalty not only necessitates additional
protections during pretrial, guilt, and sentencing phases, but also enhances the importance of the appellate process," thus creating right to counsel in capital but not necessarily in noncapital postconviction proceedings); Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 321 &
n.3 (1989) (Stevens,J., concurring in part and concurring in thejudgment) (arguing that
the finality concerns underlying Teague rule are "wholly inapplicable to the capital sentencing context").
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ror in capital habeas corpus proceedings, this view may command a
majority of the Court.
VII.

CONCLUSION

The aim of this Article has not been to criticize Brecht v. Abrahamson but to flesh out and clarify its new harmless error standard
for habeas corpus cases. Nonetheless, this attempt to answer the
various questions newly raised by Brecht serves to highlight the decision's central shortcoming. Brecht took a relatively clear and wellsettled body of law and transformed it into a swamp of ambiguities
and exceptions. The intra- and intercircuit conflicts the decision already has spawned bear outJustice O'Connor's prediction in dissent
in the case that Brecht only spells "trouble" for federal courts en19 6
gaged in habeas corpus adjudication in the future.
Brecht thus fits a pattern apparent in much of the Court's effort,
over the last 15 years, to curb habeas corpus judicially and piecemeal in the face of Congress' refusal to reform the writ more systematically. Although avowedly erected to improve efficiency and
finality, the Court's ever-expanding obstacles to habeas corpus relief
in fact have had the opposite effect. Rather than streamlining the
process of litigating and deciding habeas corpus cases, the Court's
innovations-now joined by the harmless error standard of Brechthave complicated and prolonged the review process. 19 7 Confronted
with such counterproduction, it is difficult to avoid Justice
O'Connor's suspicion that the Court's goal is not improvement in
the administration of justice but, instead, "denying [habeas corpus]
relief whenever possible." 9 8

196 Brecht, 113 S. Ct. at 1731 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (quoted supra note 185). For
examples of intra- and intercircuit conflicts in the application of Brecht, see supra notes 68,
125, 131, 145.

197 SeeJames S. Liebman, MIore than "Slightly Retro:'" The Rehnquist Court's Rout of Habeas
Corpus Jurisdiction in Teague v. Lane, 18 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SoC. CHANGE 537, 630-35

(1990-91).
198 Brecht, 113 S. Ct. at 1732 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).

